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THE MANY LANES OUT OF COURT: AGAINST PRIVATIZATION
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES
THERESA M. BEINER
I. INTRODUCTION
After Congress enacted the first laws prohibiting employment
discrimination in 1964,1 workplaces changed significantly. No longer could
employers segregate workplaces based on race or sex.2 In many
workplaces, workers who had been separated now worked side by side.
One only need board an airline flight to realize how law can transform jobs
and workplaces. Instead of seeing only the pretty, slim, young, unmarried
“stewardesses” of the 1960s, it is not uncommon to have an entirely male
flight attendant crew that includes workers over age fifty.3 Indeed, both the
pilot and co-pilot on a commercial flight might well be women. While this
transformation in workplaces is one of Title VII’s key successes, in more
recent years, scholars have lamented that employment discrimination laws
have not proven effective in eliminating the many vestiges of
discrimination in the workplace that still linger.4 Many scholars blame the
Copyright © 2014 by Theresa M. Beiner.
 Nadine Baum Distinguished Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Development,
University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law. This Article was
supported by a research grant from the Bowen School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Professors of Law Librarianship Jeff Woodmansee and Kathryn Fitzhugh for research support on
this Article as well as Bowen law students Andrea Stokes and Stefan McBride. The author also
thanks Professor Terrence Cain for helping sort out the significance of the legislative placement of
Section 118.
1. See Civil Rights Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 28 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (discussing unlawful employment practices, generally).
3. Indeed, the three female flight attendants who helped the passengers off the US Airways
flight 1549, which famously crashed into the Hudson River in 2009, were all in their fifties.
Charlie Leocha, Unsung Heroes on the Hudson—Flight Attendants on US Airways 1549,
CONSUMER TRAVELER, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.consumertraveler.com/today/unsung-heroeson-the-hudson-flight-attendants-on-us-airways-1549/.
4. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 764–72
(2011) (describing difficulties plaintiffs face in “[s]econd-[g]eneration” employment
discrimination cases); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164
(1995) (arguing “the way in which Title VII jurisprudence constructs discrimination, while
sufficient to address the deliberate discrimination prevalent in an earlier age, is inadequate to
address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias that Title VII was also intended to remedy”);
Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidiscrimination

837

838

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:837

lackluster enforcement of employment discrimination laws on the federal
courts’ inability to understand or theorize about the lingering aspects of
discrimination based on race and sex that still pervade the modern
workplace.5 In addition, some scholars have opined that the federal courts
are hostile to employment discrimination claims and do not wish to hear
them.6 This may lead one to believe that out-of-court processes might
better serve the aims of anti-discrimination laws.
This Article will argue the opposite: that there is a distinct need for
employment discrimination cases to be tried in court before juries. This
Article charts the many processes the federal courts have used over the last
twenty years to withdraw themselves from the employment discrimination

Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 194 (2009)
(noting “[e]mployment discrimination laws in the United States have not created full equality in
the workplace” and that “achieving full equality requires greater accountability for those who
make employment decisions”); Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An
Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 663, 667–69, 671–72 (2005) (outlining the current debates of whether there is too much, too
little, or simply ineffective discrimination litigation); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460–61 (2001)
(describing difficulties plaintiffs have in Title VII cases involving more ingrained forms—or
“second generation” forms—of discrimination). Some debate exists about whether Title VII or
economic factors resulted in gains made by women and members of minority groups. See
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 306–10 (1993) (concluding that Title VII did actively produce
positive effects on “female employment opportunities”).
5. See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA.
L. REV. 555, 556–57 (2001) (suggesting that courts are influenced by certain pervasive biases and
the general misconception that anti-employment discrimination cases are easy to win).
6. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate
Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 958
(2002) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia] (explaining that “[c]loser consideration
of job discrimination cases strengthens an attitudinal explanation of the defendant/plaintiff
differential”); see, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 110 disp. 2,
111, 112 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse] (noting that the
approximately forty-one percent to nine percent spread in reversal rates on appeal between
defendants and plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases is more extreme than the difference
between plaintiff and defendant reversal rates in non-job cases); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 429, 442 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, How Employment Plaintiffs
Fare] (citing statistics illustrating that “employment discrimination plaintiffs have won only 19.29
percent of judge trials but 37.77 percent of jury trials”). The difference in reversal rates on appeal
is stark. Reversal rates for defendants from plaintiff pretrial wins is thirty percent compared to a
nearly eleven percent reversal rate for plaintiffs who appeal defendant pretrial wins. The reversal
rate from trial wins is forty-one percent for defendants when plaintiffs win at trial compared to
nearly nine percent for plaintiffs when the defendant wins at trial. Clermont & Schwab, From
Bad to Worse, supra, at 110 disp. 2.
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business.7 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court of the United States has
opened the door to alternative forms of dispute resolution in order to “get
rid of” these cases.8 Whether it be through a robust pro-arbitration
jurisprudence, an uncalled-for reliance on employer internal grievance
mechanisms, or aggressive settlement conferences, courts are shunting
employment discrimination cases out of the court system and into the
sphere of private dispute resolution.9 Notably, the courts are not the only
movers of this trend; even the federal agency tasked with enforcing these
laws—the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)—is
finding means other than court cases for addressing these claims.10 In
addition, lower courts have used invigorated civil procedure rules, including
summary judgment motions and motions to dismiss, as an effective tool to
clear their dockets, leaving plaintiffs with no relief at all.11
The resulting dearth of employment discrimination cases going to trial
may not be cause for much concern. Indeed, it could be that the efforts of
prior plaintiffs have resulted in the elimination of employment
discrimination based on race, sex, and religion from the American
workplace. Nevertheless, discrimination has become more subtle,12 and
evidence of continued employment discrimination based on sex and race
abounds.13 It could also be, given arguments regarding judicial hostility to
these cases, that these alternative practices are more effective in bringing
relief to plaintiffs and in furthering the purposes of antidiscrimination laws.
7. See infra Part II.A–D (discussing the arbitration lane, internal employer grievance
mechanism lane, procedure lane, and mediation and settlement lane).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See generally Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 24–27
(2006) (coining the concept of “[d]isplacement” for the phenomenon of legal claims that once
were resolved in the legal system being resolved elsewhere); see infra Part II.A-D.
10. See infra Part II.D (discussing EEOC’s mediation success).
11. See Part II.C. But cf. Galanter, supra note 9, at 25 (proposing as a possibility what we are
seeing is not a “diminishment of trials, but their relocation”).
12. See Krieger, supra note 4, at 1164 (recognizing that these “subtle, often unconscious
forms” exist today); see also Anand Swaminathan, The Rubric of Force: Employment
Discrimination in the Context of Subtle Biases and Judicial Hostility, 3 MOD. AM. 21, 23 (2007)
(“[I]mplicit attitudes can be seen as closer to overt discrimination in that they reflect learned
behavior or the suppression of previously held overt attitudes.”).
13. See Dino Falaschetti, A Sex Difference in Risk Taking and Promotions in Hierarchies:
Evidence from Females in Legislatures, 55 J.L. & ECON. 477, 478–79 (2012) (noting the
persistence of “‘substantial gender inequality’”); Patrick L. Mason, Persistent Racial
Discrimination in the Labor Market, in AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 141–45
(Cecilia A. Conrad et al. eds., 2005) (explaining that racial discrimination in the labor market
explains at least half of black-white inequity in pay); McCormick, supra note 4, at 194 (describing
evidence that discrimination still abounds, particularly with respect to “people of color and white
women”). See generally Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1121–23
(2006) (discussing how system justification theory explains how discrimination persists).
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Unfortunately, there is no way to know how methods of alternative dispute
resolution—such as arbitration, mediation, settlement, or internal employer
grievance mechanisms—are actually working. Most of these alternative
dispute resolution systems are not studied and scrutinized by professionals.
They exist “in the shadow of the law,” as commentators suggest.14 There is
no realistic way to know if these alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
are bringing about just results. In addition, these mechanisms do not alert
employers and employees to what is and is not acceptable workplace
behavior.15
There is another problem with condemning these alternative schemes.
When Congress enacted these laws, it provided for a conciliation process
and clearly envisioned that litigants would resolve at least some of these
cases outside the court system.16 Thus, one could argue that the system is
working consistently with Title VII’s conciliation goals by encouraging
non-court dispute resolution. This Article proposes that court-driven
alternative dispute processes have gone well beyond what Congress
envisioned in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,17 the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),18 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”),19 and does not, in
the long run, further the many purposes of anti-discrimination laws.20
Most importantly, however, these alternative schemes suffer from a
significant problem aside from difficulties in assessing their efficacy.
These schemes provide no support for the “norm-enforcing” scheme that is
the American legal system. This Article, in the tradition of Professor Owen
Fiss’s Against Settlement,21 addresses the potential effects of employment
discrimination laws being enforced—if at all—through private dispute
14. See Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 2 (1981)
(discussing bargaining and regulation “in the shadow of the law”); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968
(1979) (coining this phrase in the context of divorce negotiations).
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006) (“If the [EEOC] determines after such investigation
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the [EEOC] shall endeavor to
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.”).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2006).
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).
20. See infra Part III.
21. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss,
Against Settlement] (analyzing the alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) movement which
promised to reduce the amount of litigation initiated); see also Owen M. Fiss, The History of an
Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1278 (2009) [hereinafter Fiss, History of an Idea] (noting “the
judgment of reasonableness is often made without the benefit of a truly adversarial process”).
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resolution mechanisms.22 Anti-discrimination laws serve a vital public
purpose—they set norms of behavior for workplaces and workers in the
area of equal employment opportunity. Indeed, some areas of employment
discrimination law involve assessing what the “reasonable person” would
believe.23 What other group is in a better position to make this assessment
than a group of twelve jurors?24 Picking up on Marc Galanter’s work
regarding the vanishing American trial,25 this Article argues that trials in
this area provide an important public function in setting norms of
appropriate workplace behavior and practices as well as setting monetary
values for the harm employment discrimination causes its victims.26 As this
Article will explain, there is cause for concern when alternative dispute
schemes supplant jury trials in this area of the law.
This Article begins by charting the many paths, including court
developments and agency practices, that have led employment
discrimination cases out of the court system and into alternative dispute
resolution schemes.27 This Article also considers application of civil
procedure rules that have left plaintiffs out of the court system and without
a remedy altogether.28 It argues that some of the cases leading to these
results are poorly decided, and indeed the courts frequently reach to remove
these cases from the court system.29 This Article ultimately argues, from a
22. See infra Parts II.A–D.
23. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (sexual harassment is
actionable if a “reasonable person” would find it “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment”).
24. See Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and
Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 809–19 (2002)
[hereinafter Beiner, Let the Jury Decide] (presenting examples of numerous decisions reached
outside of trial in which courts were hostile to plaintiffs’ claims, including instances where courts
overturned jury decisions in the plaintiff’s favor); Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary
Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 75 (1999) [hereinafter
Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment] (acknowledging that, in the Title VII context, “[n]o
longer are these cases being taken from judicial fact finding, but instead from a jury of the
plaintiff’s peers”).
25. See Galanter, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing “an abundance of data that shows that trials,
federal and state, civil and criminal, jury and bench, are declining precipitously”); see also Marc
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 468 (2004) (acknowledging, however, that “[f]or
30 years, even as the portion of cases tried has fallen, civil rights has remained the type of case
most likely to reach trial” (emphasis added)). Interestingly, while all civil trials are decreasing,
employment discrimination trials are decreasing at a slower rate than other civil categories.
Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 124 (noting the drop in trials in
employment discrimination cases during the period they studied was “only thirty-three percent”).
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Parts II.A–D.
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See infra Parts II.A–C.
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policy perspective, that more trials are important in this area of the law.
Eschewing problems plaintiffs encounter in this area of the law, this Article
advocates that trials are an important means of vindicating the public
purposes behind employment discrimination laws.30
II. THE ROAD OUT OF COURT
The road that leads employment discrimination claims out of the
federal court system is multi-laned. First, while the courts initially
disfavored arbitration of employment discrimination claims, eventually the
Supreme Court reinvigorated the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),31
leading to widespread enforcement of employment arbitration agreements.32
Second, the Court created an affirmative defense in sexual harassment cases
that created an incentive for employers to create internal grievance
mechanisms to handle such complaints.33 After the Court’s recent decision
in Staub v. Proctor Hospital,34 it appears that the Court is leaning toward
deferring to employer grievance mechanisms for all employment
discrimination cases.35 Third, the EEOC itself has increased its efforts to
mediate these cases.36 While this action may come from the agency’s
honest desire to achieve the best results for plaintiffs, it means that some
meritorious cases of discrimination will never come to the public’s
awareness, as they result in mediated settlements with confidentiality
provisions.37 Finally, many scholars have noted that courts and defendants
have used rules of civil procedure to thwart the efforts of employment
discrimination plaintiffs with meritorious claims.38
Some of the
observations of these scholars, as well as studies supporting their claims,
will be canvassed in this Part.39

30. See infra Parts III–IV.
31. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. See infra Part II.D.
37. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (2010) (providing that information contained in a charge under
Title VII or the ADA shall be kept confidential, but can be made public if a proceeding is
instituted under the ADA or Title VII involving that charge).
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. See infra Part II.C.
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A. The Arbitration Lane
Initially, the federal courts were reluctant to enforce arbitration
provisions in employment agreements that forbade employees from
pursuing statutory employment discrimination claims in court.40 The EEOC
agreed with this position in its 1997 policy statement.41 The courts’
position began to change in 1991, however, with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation.42
In Gilmer, the Court held that a plaintiff in an ADEA case could be
forced into compulsory arbitration by an arbitration agreement contained in
a securities registration application.43 In doing so, the Court concluded that
arbitration of ADEA claims was not inconsistent with the statutory
framework or purposes of the Act.44 The Court, however, did note that not
all statutory claims are appropriate for arbitration, and explained that if
Congress itself intended to preclude parties from waiving court remedies
for a particular statutory claim, arbitration would be inappropriate.45 This
interpretation ultimately left open the possibility that courts might read
other anti-discrimination statutes differently.
There was another wrinkle in the Federal Arbitration Act that gave
plaintiffs hope that employment discrimination claims would fall outside of
the FAA’s mandatory arbitration language—Section 1 of the FAA.46
Section 1 of the FAA exempts from its mandate for arbitration “contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”47 In extending FAA coverage
to the ADEA claim in Gilmer, the Court avoided the issue of whether the
claim fell under Section 1’s exemption by arguing that the arbitration
provision was not in the employee’s contract of employment but was
40. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59–60 (1974) (holding that an
employee subject to a collective-bargaining agreement (“CBA”) could pursue a race
discrimination claim under Title VII, despite prior arbitration pursuant to the CBA); Utley v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff in Title VII sex
discrimination suit was not required to arbitrate a claim pursuant to an arbitration agreement).
41. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, POLICY STATEMENT ON MANDATORY
BINDING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF
EMPLOYMENT (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html.
42. 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (concluding that plaintiff did not meet his burden to show that
Congress intended to exclude arbitration of claims under the ADEA).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 26–30.
45. Id. at 26. Indeed, the plaintiff in Gilmer conceded that there was no legislative history or
statutory text to support this for the ADEA. Id. at 26–27.
46. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (exempting workers in foreign and interstate commerce from
FAA).
47. Id.
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instead in his registration application.48 Thus, the Court “le[ft] for another
day the issue” of whether Section 1 exempted all employment agreements.49
The possibility remained that when faced with an actual agreement between
employer and employee, the Court might hold that the FAA’s Section 1
exemption applied.
The Court finally decided this issue in 2001 in Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams.50 In this case, the Court held that only employment contracts
involving employees who worked directly in commerce, like the seamen
and railroad employees listed in Section 1, fit within the exemption from
arbitration.51 A majority of the Court rejected a variety of arguments raised
by the plaintiff, Adams, who did not raise his claims under federal
antidiscrimination laws but instead raised them under California’s Fair
Employment and Housing Act.52 Adams argued that the Court should
interpret the exemption phrase “any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce” in Section 1 broadly to encompass the
limits of Congress’s contemporary Commerce Clause authority.53 Because
the Court had earlier adopted an expansive reading of the phrase
“transaction involving commerce” in Section 2 of the FAA,54 Adams argued
that the Court should likewise read the language of Section 1 expansively.55
The Court rejected this argument on numerous grounds, including
reasoning that the principle of ejusdem generis suggested that the specific
words used in the phrase—”seaman” and “railroad workers”—implied that
the residual term was meant to encompass similar workers.56 The Court
also explained that the distinctions between the phrases “involving
commerce” (used in Section 2) and “in . . . interstate commerce” (used in
Section 1) suggested that the latter phrase was narrower.57
The Court also rejected the argument that Congress limited its
language in the Section 1 exemption because a series of Supreme Court
decisions in the early twentieth century limited Congress’s authority over
48. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
49. Id. The parties in Gilmer also did not raise the issue, but instead amicus curiae raised it.
Id.
50. 532 U.S. 105, 112–13 (2001) (explaining that, while the Court in Gilmer did not deem it
necessary to reach the meaning of Section 1, “the issue reserved in Gilmer is presented here”).
51. Id. at 115, 119.
52. Id. at 110.
53. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114.
54. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277, 279–80 (1995) (reading
“involving commerce” in Section 2 of the FAA to reach the full extent of Congress’s current
commerce clause authority).
55. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114.
56. Id. at 114–15.
57. Id. at 115–17.
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employment-related commerce.58 Adams argued that this decision evinced
Congress’s intent to legislate to the limits of its authority at the time in
enacting Section 1, and thus, like the modern interpretation of Section 2,
this boundary now included workers like himself.59 The Court, however,
was not swayed by these arguments and extended the FAA to Adams’s state
law employment discrimination claims.60
The Court’s holding still left an opening for plaintiffs to litigate
specific federal anti-discrimination claims if Congress expressed an
intention not to send the particular type of claim to arbitration. With the

58. Justice Souter described the state of the law in 1925, when the FAA was passed, well in
his dissent:
When the Act was passed (and the commerce power was closely confined) our case law
indicated that the only employment relationships subject to the commerce power were
those in which workers were actually engaged in interstate commerce. Thus, by using
“engaged in” for the exclusion, Congress showed an intent to exclude to the limit of its
power to cover employment contracts in the first place, and it did so just as clearly as its
use of “involving commerce” showed its intent to legislate to the hilt over commercial
contracts at a more general level.
Id. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. The Court was still in the heyday of the Lochner era in 1925 when the FAA was enacted.
During this period, it struck many state and federal laws regulating the conditions of work. See,
e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 285, 302 (1936) (holding the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act unconstitutional on commerce clause grounds, reasoning that “‘[m]ining is not
interstate commerce, but like manufacturing, is a local business, subject to local regulation and
taxation’”); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (holding a minimum
wage law for women unconstitutional). For more on Lochner, see PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW
YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 2 (1998) (proposing to discuss Lochner, which for
“eighty years [] has served legal scholars as a poignant example of judicial activism”); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lessons of Lochner,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1447–55 (2001) (discussing the lessons from Lochner and suggesting
that “even if there was a jurisprudential basis for Lochner-era decisions, the critique of
constitutional judging as inconsistent with democracy still found full voice”); Stephen A. Siegel,
Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4
(1991) (describing Lochner as a “transitional era” during which “tenets of early and modern
American constitutionalism” blended together); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 873, 875 (1987) (understanding Lochner from a different perspective—that is, “to
symbolize not merely an aggressive judicial role, but an approach that imposes a constitutional
requirement of neutrality, and understands the term to refer to preservation of the existing
distribution of wealth and entitlements under the baseline of the common law”). There are a
plethora of other articles on Lochner. As Cass Sunstein noted in Lochner’s Legacy, criticism of
the Lochner era as representing overreaching by the Court into areas that belonged to the political
branches has “spawned an enormous literature.” Sunstein, supra, at 874. Recently, however, this
view has been challenged. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 3 (2011) (offering “the first comprehensive
modern analysis of Lochner and its progeny, free from the baggage of the tendentious accounts of
Progressives, New Dealers, and their successors on the left and, surprisingly, the right.”).
60. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119 (“In sum, the text of the FAA forecloses the construction of
§ 1 followed by the Court of Appeals in the case under review, a construction which would
exclude all employment contracts from the FAA.” (emphasis added)).
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exception of a brief period of time in the Ninth Circuit,61 however, each
court that addressed this issue held that the FAA covered Title VII, ADA,
and ADEA claims.62 Indeed, without ever considering the legislative
history of the antidiscrimination statutes involved in the case, the Court in
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.63 broadly endorsed arbitration to resolve
employment-related disputes.64 In that case, the Court stated that
“[e]mployment contracts . . . are covered by the FAA.”65 It also explained
that federal statutory claims can be resolved pursuant to arbitration
agreements because such agreements do not amount to a waiver of a
statutory claim, but rather simply select the forum in which the claimant
will pursue the claim.66 The Court specifically avoided looking at the
purposes behind the FAA and the ADA, instead reasoning that the statutory
text provided a clear answer to the specific question involved—whether the
EEOC could pursue a claim on an employee’s behalf in spite of his
arbitration agreement with the employer.67 In concluding that the EEOC
did have such authority, the Court had no need to address the policies
underlying the ADA and what those policies might indicate about the
arbitrability of claims by individuals.
Interestingly, there is considerable support in both the legislative
history of the ADA and the amendments to Title VII through the Civil
61. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 1998)
(stating “Duffield ha[d] met her burden of showing that Congress intended in enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to preclude the compulsory arbitration of Title VII disputes”), overruled by
EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
62. See Luce, 345 F.3d at 748–49 (canvassing circuit courts and stating that “[a]ll of the other
circuits have concluded that Title VII does not bar compulsory arbitration agreements”); see also
14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009) (holding CBAs “clearly and unmistakably
require[] union members to arbitrate ADEA claims”); Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc.,
703 F.3d 36, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that the FAA preempts the ADA claim brought by
plaintiffs).
63. 534 U.S. 279 (2002). The Court in this case addressed whether the EEOC could bring a
lawsuit under the ADA on behalf of a wronged employee in spite of the employee’s prior consent
to an arbitration agreement that covered the claim. Id. at 282. In ruling that the EEOC had an
independent right to pursue the action, the Court made clear in its opinion that its analysis applied
to Title VII as well. Id. at 287, 295–96.
64. Id. at 289, 295 n.10, 296. Courts have relied on language from this case in enforcing
arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F. Supp. 2d 555, 560
(M.D. N.C. 2004) (noting that despite the FAA’s limiting language, “the FAA applies to most
employment contracts, including at-will employment contracts”); Gillispie v. Vill. of Franklin
Park, 405 F. Supp. 2d 904, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (same).
65. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 289.
66. Id. at 295 n.10 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 472
U.S. 614, 628 (1985); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)). Neither
of the cases cited examined whether Congress intended for such statutory claims to be pressed into
mandatory arbitration by pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
67. Id. at 285–87.
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Rights Act of 1991 that Congress did not intend to force employees to
arbitrate these claims.68 The impetus to send Title VII claims to arbitration
comes through Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.69 In Section
118, Congress stated: “Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials,
and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or
provisions of Federal law amended by this title.”70
The ADA has similar language.71 The Older Worker Benefits
Protection Act (“OWBPA”),72 an amendment to the ADEA, likewise

68. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 97 (1991) (“The Committee emphasizes, however,
that the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant,
the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus, for example, the Committee believes that any
agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration . . . does not preclude the affected person from
seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.” (emphasis added)).
69. Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 118, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991).
70. Id. (emphasis added). Section 118, however, does not appear as a section within Title 42,
Chapter 21, Subchapter VI of the U.S. Code. Instead, Congress placed it in the notes following
Section 1981. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2006). This does not, however, undermine its force as law.
After laws are passed by Congress and signed by the President, they are published in
chronological order in the Statutes at Large, which serves as “‘legal evidence’” of the law.
Gonzalez v. Vill. of W. Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 661 n.6 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 112;
Mary Whisner, The United States Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and Positive Law, 101 LAW LIBR.
J. 545, 546 (2009)). That chronological arrangement, however, is not efficient for researchers, and
therefore, the statutes are arranged by subject matter for publication in the U.S. Code. Gonzalez,
671 F.3d at 661 n.6 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 285b; Whisner, supra, at 546). Title 1 of U.S.C. § 204(a)
declares that the U.S. Code establishes “‘prima facie the laws of the United States, general and
permanent in their nature . . . Provided, however, [t]hat whenever titles of such Code shall have
been enacted into positive law the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the laws therein
contained, in all the courts[.]” United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 n.4 (1964). The Supreme
Court has said that “‘the very meaning of “prima facie” is that the Code cannot prevail over the
Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent.’” Id. (quoting Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S.
423, 426 (1943)). Even where Congress has enacted a codification into positive law, the “‘change
of arrangement . . . cannot be regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the enactment. For it
will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their
effect, unless such intention is clearly expressed.’” Id. (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957)). If construction of a section of the U.S. Code that has not been
enacted into positive law is necessary, “‘recourse must be had to the original statutes
themselves.’” Id. (quoting Murrell v. W. Union Tel. Co., 160 F.2d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 1947)). The
Office of Law Revision Counsel prepared and continues to prepare titles of the United States Code
for reenactment as positive law by Congress in order to “‘remove ambiguities, contradictions, and
other imperfections both of substance and of form,’ while ‘conform[ing] to the understood policy,
intent, and purpose of the Congress in the original enactments.’” Gonzalez, 671 F.3d at 661 n.6
(citing 2 U.S.C. § 285b(1) (2006); Whisner, supra, at 553–56). For those titles that Congress has
enacted into positive law, the Code constitutes “‘legal evidence’” of the law. Id. (citing 1 U.S.C.
§ 204(a) (2006)). Thus, while the placement of Section 118 as a note in the U.S. Code is unusual,
it is contained in the Statutes at Large as well. Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 118, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (applying Section 1981a to the ADA); see also text
accompanying note 70.
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protects older workers in signing arbitration agreements.73 Section 118 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 “encourage[s]” parties in Title VII cases to use
alternative dispute resolution but does not mandate it.74 Instead the section
suggests its use “[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law.”75
What does it mean to “encourage” alternative dispute resolution? Most
lower courts that have considered the issue have concluded that this
language is not ambiguous but rather expresses Congress’s clear preference
for alternative dispute resolution.76 As a result, few courts have
investigated the legislative history of this section carefully, asserting instead
that the clarity of the language did not necessitate it.77
Upon scrutiny of the legislative history of Section 118, one
understands that it was convenient for the lower courts to assess its
language as unambiguous. The section of the House Report addressing the
alternative dispute resolution provision makes clear that Congress did not
intend for courts to enforce, under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements absent both parties’ consent:
Section 216 encourages the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution to resolve disputes arising under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 . . . or the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act . . . where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law. . . .
This section is intended to encourage alternative means of dispute
resolution that are already authorized by law.78

72. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.).
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C) (2006) (“An individual may not waive any right or claim
under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Except as provided in paragraph
(2), a waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum . . . (C) the
individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed.”).
74. Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 118, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir.
1999) (“[W]e assume, as does the Supreme Court, that the drafters of Title VII and the
amendments introduced in the Act were well aware of what language was required for Congress to
evince an intent to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies.”); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that “Congress has repeatedly
rejected legislation that would explicitly bar mandatory agreements to arbitrate employment
discrimination claims” and holding “neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history”
illustrates this preclusive intent); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co, Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir.
1998) (same).
77. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 752–53 (9th Cir.
2003) (“We conclude . . . that this history should not be relied on to establish that Congress
intended to preclude waiver of a judicial forum in derogation of a clear and unambiguous
statute.”).
78. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 97 (1991).
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The Committee emphasizes, however, that the use of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms “is intended to supplement, not supplant, the
remedies provided by Title VII.”79 Thus, for example, “the Committee
believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration,
whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking
relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.”80 As the Committee
further mentions, “[t]his view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.”81 Finally,
the House Report adds that “[t]he Committee does not intend this section to
be used to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be
available.”82
While the language of Section 118 is ambiguous, this legislative
history is not. Indeed, this House Report reveals that Congress meant for
victims of employment discrimination, at least for purposes of Title VII and
the ADA,83 to have all available methods of enforcing their statutory rights
at their disposal.84 The Committee’s reference to Gardner-Denver
solidifies this position. In 1974’s Gardner-Denver, the Court held that an
employee who arbitrated his age claim pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement’s arbitration provision could not be precluded from pursuing his
case in court.85 Thus, the House Report’s reference to Gardner-Denver
further supports that Congress intended for plaintiffs to have court actions
as an option—rather than be limited by pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
This position makes sense, given that the 1991 Act expanded remedies for
victims of discrimination, including permitting jury trials86 as well as
awards of compensatory and punitive damages.87 Limiting plaintiffs to

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.; 415 U.S. 36, 48–49 (1974).
82. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 97.
83. The Act also covered cases brought under Section 1981, which covers race
discrimination. Id.
84. Indeed, early commentators looking at the language opined that the history might well
cause problems for enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Thomas J.
Piskorski & David B. Ross, Private Arbitration as the Exclusive Means of Resolving EmploymentRelated Disputes, 19 EMP. RELATIONS L.J. 205, 208–09 (1993) (“This legislative history could
limit the support Section 118 otherwise would provide to the proponents of the enforceability of
private arbitration agreements with respect to statutory claims”).
85. 415 U.S. at 59–60.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006) (“If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive
damages under this section—(1) any party may demand a trial by jury.”).
87. Id. § 1981a(b).
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arbitration under certain circumstances is inconsistent with the general
purpose of the 1991 Act, which expanded court remedies.
Yet, the only circuit court to hold that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
intended to preserve court remedies in the face of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements was the Ninth Circuit,88 and that position was short-lived thanks
to the momentum of other circuits holding otherwise.89 Few of the courts of
appeals that addressed the issue have explicitly engaged the language in the
House Report described above. The Supreme Court alluded to it in a
footnote in the 2009 case 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,90 but conveniently
avoided engaging in much analysis of the House Report, instead opining
rather summarily:
But the legislative history mischaracterizes the holding of
Gardner-Denver, which does not prohibit collective bargaining
for arbitration of ADEA claims.
Moreover, reading the
legislative history in the manner suggested by respondents would
create a direct conflict with the statutory text, which encourages
the use of arbitration for dispute resolution without imposing any
constraints on collective bargaining. In such a contest, the text
must prevail.91
The Court’s cursory analysis did not do the competing argument
justice, as it could have read this legislative history consistently with the
statutory text. The Court could have read the statute as “encourage[ing]”
parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution when they agreed to do so
post-dispute. Indeed, this interpretation seems the most reasonable reading
when one considers the House Report, statutory text, and the Civil Rights
Act’s purpose to expand court remedies for discrimination.92
The few courts of appeals that have considered the language, including
the First Circuit and ultimately the Ninth Circuit, have concluded that it did
not evince congressional intent to provide a choice for plaintiffs who
entered into pre-dispute arbitration agreements. The First Circuit in
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith93 reasoned that the
88. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Col, 144 F.3d 1182, 1196 (9th Cir. 1998),
overruled by EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 748–49 (9th Cir. 2003).
89. See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 748–49 (9th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that “[i]n the post-Gilmer world, our decision in Duffield stands alone”); Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding “there was no
congressional intent to preclude pre-dispute arbitration agreements manifested in the 1991 CRA or
the OWBPA[,]” despite concluding that the agreement in the case was not enforceable).
90. 556 U.S. 247, 259 n.6 (2009) (noting that “Section 118 expresses Congress’s support for
alternative dispute resolution”).
91. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 78–87.
93. 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).
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Court’s decision in Gilmer, coming some six months before the enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, was evidence of Congress’s acquiescence
in the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.94 In addition, it
relied on an earlier case it decided involving the ADA, which included
similar language in its legislative history.95 The Rosenberg court also
reasoned that language in the OWBPA stating an older worker could not
“waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed”
was meant to apply only to the underlying statutory rights and not the right
to jury trial.96 The Ninth Circuit, after initially holding that statutory
discrimination claims were not subject to pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, changed its position.97
While there may be some question as to what evidence from floor
debates shows regarding the interpretation of Section 118,98 the House
Report is the most authoritative interpretation of what Congress meant by
the provision. The Supreme Court has stated “that the authoritative source
for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill,
which ‘represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those
Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.’”99
Reliance on the comments of a single member or statements from floor
debates is discouraged.100 Thus, committee reports, such as the House

94. Id. at 8.
95. See id. at 9 (noting that the ADA’s language can only reasonably be interpreted as
favoring arbitration (citing Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 150 (1st Cir. 1998))).
96. Id. at 12 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2006)). There is dicta in Gilmer that supports this
position. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (“Congress . . . did not
explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims, even in its recent
amendments to the ADEA.”).
97. See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that its holding in Duffield was “in error[,]” concluding that it incorrectly interpreted the
1991 Act’s text, legislative history, and general purpose).
98. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1196 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating
that “Congress in fact specifically rejected a proposal that would have allowed employers to
enforce ‘compulsory arbitration’ agreements”), overruled by Luce, 345 F.3d at 760 (suggesting the
same).
99. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168,
186 (1969)).
100. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982) (“We have eschewed reliance on
the passing comments of one Member and casual statements from the floor debates.”); Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (finding despite support
for petitioners’ argument “in a Conference Report four years after the enactment of [the relevant
provision of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) at issue] . . . ‘legislative history’ of this
sort cannot be viewed as controlling”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968)
(suggesting that “the more authoritative reports of the Senate and Armed Services Committees”
are particularly helpful resources in deciphering legislative purpose).
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Report concerning Section 118, are more authoritative than statements or
comments made on the House or Senate floor.101
One need not conclude that the courts are necessarily wrong about
enforcing arbitration clauses in this context to make the larger point that
these cases are finding a way out of the court system. The purpose of
recounting some of the history here is not to assess whether the U.S.
Supreme Court or the lower federal courts made the correct assessment on
this particular issue.102 The point here is that there is a reasonable reading
of the statute and its legislative history that would have precluded an
employer from forcing an employee into arbitration against his or her will
on the basis of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The courts, however,
chose to go in the opposite direction, making these contracts enforceable.103
Similarly, one could read the OWBPA’s preclusion of enforcement of
employment agreements that include provisions that “waive rights or claims
that may arise after the date the waiver is executed” to encompass the right
to jury trial.104 Yet, most courts that have considered it have refused to read
the statutory text in this manner.105 These decisions in and of themselves
provide evidence that courts are sending these cases out of court and to
arbitration when there are compelling arguments that Congress intended
otherwise. Thus, in situations in which the courts have leeway in
interpreting employment discrimination law in a manner that tends to lead
101. See supra note 100; see also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384, 395–96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Resort to legislative history is only justified where
the face of the Act is inescapably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond
Committee reports, which presumably are well considered and carefully prepared. . . . [T]o select
casual statements from floor debates, not always distinguished for candor or accuracy, as a basis
for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact is to substitute ourselves for the
Congress in one of its important functions.”).
102. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1196–97 (suggesting in the debates that the Civil Rights Act of
1991 was not intended to preclude enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements; however, the
House Report, which provides a more authoritative interpretation of the statute than statements by
law makers from the floor, is more reasonably read to preclude enforcement of these agreements).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 4546–67, 93–97.
104. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1999)
(quoting 2 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)) (“Amici point to legislative history that suggests that Congress was
particularly concerned about older workers losing the right to a jury trial for ADEA claims.”).
105. Id. at 13 (“A party who agrees to arbitrate ‘does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’”); see
also Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1139 (1999) (noting that that OWBPA’s legislative history “provide[s] persuasive evidence that
the protection it affords is limited to the waiver of substantive rights under the ADEA”); Williams
v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he OWBPA protects against
the waiver of a right or claim, not against the waiver of a judicial forum.”). But see Hammaker v.
Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580–81 (E.D. Va. 2002) (distinguishing Seus,
Rosenberg, and Williams and holding that the right to jury trial was one of the rights not subject to
waiver under Section (C) of the OWBPA).
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such cases out of court, the courts are not bashful in exercising their
interpretative powers to make it so.106
B. The Internal Employer Grievance Mechanism Lane
Another means courts are using to take employment discrimination
claims out of court is supporting the use of employer grievance mechanisms
as a defense in such cases.107 The Court appears to be in the process of
extending a defense that arose in the context of sexual harassment cases108
to all forms of employment discrimination claims. In the seemingly proplaintiff 2011 Supreme Court case Staub v. Proctor Hospital,109 the Court
suggested in the context of a discrimination claim under the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”) that
employees who fail to take advantage of internal employer grievance
mechanisms might be precluded from proceeding in court.110 Similar to
arbitration case law, this line of cases could lead many employment
discrimination cases out of court.

106. There is a significant body of work criticizing the use of arbitration in the context of
employment agreements. See, e.g., Craig Smith & Eric V. Moyé, Outsourcing American Civil
Justice: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 281, 292 (2012) (disagreeing with enforcement of employment arbitration agreements on
numerous grounds, including that they are not the result of arms-length bargaining and quoting
with approval the Court’s position in Gilmer that “because arbitrators generally do not issue
opinions, mandatory arbitration would result ‘in a lack of public knowledge of employers’
discriminatory policies, an inability to obtain effective appellate review, and a stifling of the
development of the law’”); see also infra notes 338–346 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The
Endogeniety of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406,
407–08 (1999) (describing how employer created grievance mechanisms were incorporated into
legal standards by the courts). See generally Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and
Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM.
J. SOC. 1401, 1422–35 (1990) (providing empirical evidence illustrating that “[t]he civil rights
movement and mandates of the 1960s altered organizations’ legal environments by heightening
societal attention to issues of fair governance”).
108. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998) (stating that, while an
employer is “subject to vicarious liability . . . for an actionable hostile environment[,]” the
employer may raise an affirmative defense comprising of two elements: “(a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise”); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998) (same).
109. 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
110. See id. at 1194 n.4 (expressing no direct opinion on whether or not the defendant would
have been able to use an affirmative defense if the plaintiff did not take advantage of the
employer’s grievance mechanism despite recognizing that the plaintiff took advantage of the
employer’s grievance process).
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Internal employee grievance mechanisms have traditionally played a
role in sexual harassment cases.111 In the first case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized a claim for sexual harassment—Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson112—the Court considered what effect an employer complaint
process might have on an employer’s liability for such discrimination.113
The defendant in Meritor argued that it had an internal complaint process
that the plaintiff should have used but did not.114 The employer argued that
failure to use the provided grievance process provided a defense to
liability.115 Avoiding a definitive rule on the issue, the Court held that the
grievance process set up by the employer in that case was insufficient on a
number of grounds.116 In particular, it required the employee, Ms. Vinson,
to report the sexual harassment to her harasser, who was also her
supervisor.117 After the Court’s determination in Meritor, the courts of
appeals adopted a variety of approaches to the issue.118 Eventually the
jurisprudence became sufficiently confused on the issue of liability for
supervisor harassment that the Court granted certiorari on the issue in
Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton.119
The Court in these two cases determined that an employer is
vicariously liable for supervisor hostile environment harassment, subject to
an affirmative defense to “liability or damages.”120 The defense is

111. See Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 198 (2004) (explaining how the courts have
created incentives for employers to use these mechanisms).
112. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
113. Id. at 72–73 (“reject[ing] petitioner’s view that the mere existence of a grievance
procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with respondent’s failure to invoke that
procedure, must insulate petitioner from liability”).
114. Id. at 72.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 72–73 (suggesting that petitioner could bolster its contention that its
nondiscrimination policy and internal grievance procedure should “insulate” it from liability “if its
procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward”).
117. Id. at 73.
118. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785–86 (1998) (acknowledging
confusion in lower courts).
119. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998) (“We granted certiorari
to assist in defining the relevant standards of employer liability.”); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785–86
(same).
120. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. No court has ever used the defense
to limit damages, although the Faragher and Ellerth Courts clearly contemplated it. Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. Quid pro quo cases, in which a supervisor takes a
tangible employment action against a plaintiff, are not subject to the defense. The employer is
vicariously liable in such a case. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (stating “[n]o affirmative defense is
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comprised of two parts. First, the employer must show that it took
reasonable steps to prevent and correct harassment.121 Second, the
employer must show that the employee failed to take advantage of any
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.122 An internal grievance mechanism could help an employer
satisfy both prongs of the affirmative defense. The existence of an antidiscrimination policy and grievance mechanism might help the employer
show that it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct any sexual
harassment of which it became aware.123 The employer could also use its
anti-discrimination policy and grievance mechanism to satisfy the second
prong, by showing that the employee failed to take advantage of such a
program.124 Thus, the Court essentially promoted the use of such grievance
mechanisms as an antidote to liability for sexual harassment.125 Many
employers picked up on this position and created such policies to “bullet
proof[]” themselves from potential liability for supervisor harassment.126
The Court in Ellerth and Faragher was clear in articulating why it set
up such a standard for harassment claims. First, it explained that such a
defense would not be available if the supervisor took some action against
the harassed employee because he or she refused to agree to the sexually
explicit demands of his or her supervisor.127 Generally referred to as quid
pro quo claims, it was clear to the Court “that if an employer demanded
sexual favors from an employee in return for a job benefit, discrimination
with respect to terms or conditions of employment was explicit.”128 Hostile
environment sexual harassment, however, was different.129 In this context,
the employer, in theory, obtained no benefit from this behavior and often
had policies that prohibited employees from committing such acts of

available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment”).
121. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
122. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
123. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
124. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
125. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (explaining that an anti-harassment policy with complaint
process would help employers prove the affirmative defense); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08
(same).
126. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment
Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 976 (1999).
127. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08 (both noting the defense is only
available if no tangible employment action is taken against harassed employee).
128. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752.
129. See id. (distinguishing between quid pro quo claims and hostile environment claims and
suggesting that “[l]ess obvious was whether an employer’s sexually demeaning behavior altered
terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title VII”).
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harassment.130 Thus, plaintiffs had difficulty arguing that such behavior
was within the course and scope of the supervisor’s employment. From the
Court’s perspective, this behavior might occur even when the employer
explicitly forbade it in its workplace.131 As a result, for an employer who
had made attempts to eliminate harassment and provide relief internally for
victims of harassment, the Court set up this affirmative defense.
Commentators have criticized this defense because it requires an
employer simply to put some sort of training program and grievance
mechanism in place without determining what sorts of programs might
actually work to address and eliminate harassment.132 It became very easy
for employers who did so to escape liability for even egregious forms of
sexual harassment.133 In addition, employers were not liable for co-worker
harassment unless they “knew or should have known of the harassment”
and failed to take reasonable corrective action.134 Under this standard, an
employee who does not complain through an internal grievance process
fails to give notice to the employer; thus, the employer generally would
have no reason to know of the harassment and would escape liability for coworker harassment as well.135 Indeed, the courts tend to look at these cases
as resulting from the acts of “one bad apple”—that is, one bad employee—
instead of being the result of a more systemic problem at the place of

130. Id. at 757.
131. See id. at 756 (explaining that it is not clear how hostile environment harassment benefits
the employer).
132. See infra text accompanying notes 312–318.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 312–318.
134. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)–(e) (2013) (“With respect to conduct between fellow
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct,
unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.”); see also Faragher,
524 U.S. at 799 (noting that circuits had “uniformly” judged co-worker harassment under a
negligence standard); EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 675 (4th Cir. 2011) (“So long as the
employer’s response to each known incident of coworker harassment is reasonably prompt, and
the employer takes remedial measures that are reasonably calculated to end the harassment,
liability may not be imputed to the employer as a matter of law.”); Duch v. Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757,
762 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining plaintiff “must demonstrate that her employer ‘failed to provide a
reasonable avenue for complaint’ or that ‘it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known, about the harassment yet failed to take appropriate remedial action’” (quoting
Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000))); Courtney v. Landair Transp.,
Inc., 227 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n coworker cases the standard is based on a
‘reasonableness’ standard: ‘when an employer responds to charges of coworker sexual
harassment, the employer can be liable only if its response manifests indifference or
unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known.’” (quoting
Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872–73 (6th Cir. 1997))).
135. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 126, at 975 (stating an employee who does not use his
employer’s grievance process is without redress).
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employment.136 Hence, courts are reluctant to hold employers liable for
such employee misconduct.137
The courts have been less reluctant to hold employers liable for more
traditional forms of discrimination—namely, discriminatory failure to hire,
firing, pay discrimination, etc.138 A defense based on an employer
grievance process was not thought to extend to these types of employer
actions.139 There are suggestions in Staub, however, that the Court is
considering extending the rationale of the Ellerth/Faragher line of cases to
the average employment discrimination claim, at least under certain
circumstances.140 In Staub, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, purported to resolve the split over application of subordinate
bias liability in employment discrimination suits.141 The issue arose in an
unusual discrimination setting—discrimination based on the plaintiff’s
membership in the United States Army Reserve.142 Staub argued that two
supervisors harbored resentment toward him because of his military service
and were determined to see him fired.143 Eventually, these supervisors
wrote Staub up for workplace infractions that Staub disputed, and an
employee in the human resources department, Buck, made the decision to
fire him.144 There was no evidence that Buck acted based on her own
discriminatory animus.145 At the time of his termination, Staub complained
to Buck that the two other supervisors wanted him fired because of his
military service.146 Buck reviewed Staub’s entire employment file and

136. See Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 817, 818–26 (2005) (arguing that courts tend to see discriminatory harassment as the act of
“one bad apple,” and thus an individual problem, instead of a workplace-wide problem).
137. See id. at 835 (explaining the Court’s word choice indicates an individual rather than
organizational focus, thus showcasing its reluctance to hold an employer liable).
138. Indeed, Title VII explicitly applies to these forms of discrimination. The statute states,
among other things, that it is an unlawful employment practice “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2006).
139. The Court’s refusal to extend the defense to tangible employment actions in Ellerth and
Faragher supports this interpretation. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765
(1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).
140. See supra text accompanying note 110, infra text accompanying notes 159–164.
141. Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1189, 1191 (2011).
142. Id. at 1189.
143. Id. at 1190.
144. Id. at 1189–90.
145. Id. at 1190.
146. Id. at 1189–90.
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decided to fire him anyway.147
She never investigated Staub’s
contentions.148
The employer hospital argued that the independent investigation of the
alleged discriminatory animus by Buck (and her rejection of the allegations)
should negate any prior discrimination.149 The Court rejected this
contention in part, explaining that if the decisionmaker’s actions were not
based on the original biased actions, an employer would not be liable under
USERRA; however, if the decisionmaker takes the biased information or
report into consideration in the decisionmaking process, bias can remain a
causal factor in the decision.150 As Justice Scalia explained, “[w]e are
aware of no principle in tort or agency law under which an employer’s mere
conduct of an independent investigation has a claim-preclusive effect.”151
Thus, the Court seemed skeptical of the use of internal investigations as a
mechanism by which employers can break the chain of causation, although
it did contemplate that an employer may have legitimate reasons for an
adverse employment action that, while not encompassing discriminatory
animus, will relieve it of liability.152
While the Court explained this in the body of its decision, in a footnote
later in the case, the Court appears to suggest that internal employee
grievance mechanisms might provide a defense to employer liability if an
employee, unlike Staub, did not complain through such a process.153 In
footnote four the majority opened up potential caveats.154 First, the Court
explained, rather cryptically, that “the employer would be liable only when
the supervisor acts within the scope of his employment, or when the
supervisor acts outside the scope of his employment and liability would be
imputed to the employer under traditional agency principles.”155 Given the
language of USERRA, which covers hiring, rehiring, retention, promotion,
and benefits of employment, one is hard pressed to think of a situation in
which a decisionmaker would be acting outside the scope of his or her
employment and engage in an action that is covered by USERRA. 156 The
Court then cited Ellerth.157 It is not clear what the Court meant by citing
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1189–90.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1194 n.4.
Id.
Id.
38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2006).
Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 n.4.
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Ellerth, although perhaps a reference to employer grievance mechanisms
later in the footnote provides some insight.158
The Court later noted that Staub used the employer’s internal
grievance mechanism, and, citing Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,159
once again “express[ed] no view as to whether Proctor [the hospital] would
have an affirmative defense if he [Staub] did not.”160 The issue in Suders
was whether constructive discharge constituted a tangible employment
action for which an employer would not be able to use the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense in a sexual harassment case.161 The portion of the
Suders case Justice Scalia cites in Staub is the discussion of the
circumstances under which an employer will or will not have such a defense
in a purported constructive discharge scenario.162 It is unclear, however,
what Justice Scalia meant in the context of Staub. Was he alluding to
harassment based on military status? If Justice Scalia meant to suggest an
Ellerth/Faragher type defense is available when the employee is
discharged, as was the case for Staub, it would appear to presage an
extension of the defense to non-harassment employment discrimination
claims or at least claims that involve the animus of non-decisionmaking
employees.163 The Ellerth/Faragher defense already has proven to be an
effective tool for granting summary judgment for employers.164 In my
opinion, extending an employer grievance mechanism defense to more
discrimination claims will allow courts to throw more employment
discrimination claims out of court before the fact finder can scrutinize the
discriminatory behavior. Unlike sexual harassment, a supervisor’s decision
158. Id.
159. 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
160. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 n.4.
161. Suders, 542 U.S. at 143.
162. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 n.4 (citing Suders, 542 U.S. at 148–50).
163. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 150 (“The [First and Seventh Circuits] in Reed and Robinson[,
respectively,] properly recognized that Ellerth and Faragher, which divided the universe of
supervisor-harassment claims according to the presence or absence of an official act, mark the
path constructive discharge claims based on harassing conduct must follow.”).
164. Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 120 (2001) [hereinafter Beiner, Using Evidence]; see also
Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science
Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 273, 331 (2001) [hereinafter Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge] (explaining how,
with respect to the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense, “Courts simply have not proven
to be in the best position to understand the victim’s perspective, especially at the summary
judgment stage, where many of these cases are decided”); M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact:
Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311, 345
(1999) (explaining that “on numerous occasions, the defendant employer’s ability to demonstrate
any sort of remedial action has been treated by district courts as a basis for dismissing the
plaintiff’s case”).
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to terminate an employee, even if the discriminatory animus comes from
non-decisionmaking supervisors, does not have weak links to actions that
implicate employer behavior. Indeed, if a decisionmaker is motivated to
fire a reservist because of biased information from the reservist’s direct
supervisor or co-worker, what difference does it make whether a grievance
mechanism is in place? The employer still has fired the employee because
of his reservist status.
The Supreme Court has not yet declared that the Ellerth/Faragher
defense applies to all employment discrimination claims, but it looks like
that might be coming.165 I believe if the Court does so, this decision will
make it even more difficult for plaintiffs to get to trial in these cases. It is
already difficult to know what is and is not sufficiently harassing to be
actionable.166 In part, this confusion is due to the courts’ reliance on
employer internal grievance mechanisms, which keep juries away from the
merits of these cases.167 This reliance is particularly problematic in
harassment cases, because the standard requires that a “reasonable person”
would find the behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.168 While employers complain that
they do not know what constitutes harassment,169 the courts continue to
refuse to let juries decide cases so that a community standard can evolve.170
As explained later in this Article, this instance is just one in which a
grievance mechanism outside of the court system leaves society flummoxed
when it comes to identifying a standard.
It is also another avenue for privatization, although unlike arbitrations,
which involve at least purportedly neutral decisionmakers,171 this time the
fox is watching the hen house.172 The courts would be giving the process
over to the employer, not only leaving the process in private hands that are
unaccountable to the public, but also placing that process in the hands of the
defendant employer.173 As one plaintiff in an employment discrimination
165. See supra text accompanying notes 153–164; see also Vance v. Ball St. Univ., 133 S. Ct.
2434, 2439, 2444 (2013) (narrowing the term “supervisor” in the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense, thereby requiring defendants to meet the lesser co-worker standard in more cases).
166. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 24, at 820.
167. Id.
168. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
169. See Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 24, at 791–92 (noting that human resources
professionals complain that there is no clear definition of what constitutes sexual harassment).
170. Id. at 820.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 338–340 (describing problems with repeat players).
172. See Lawton, supra note 136, at 838 (stating that employers hold the power to control
their liability by using internal grievance mechanisms).
173. See id. (describing how employers have shaped workplace sexual harassment
procedures).
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suit put it: “I went [to the company’s internal EEO office], and of course
they said they were going to investigate, but how do you investigate
yourself? . . . There’s not an outside [agency] doing it. [The employer is]
doing it.”174 As Nielsen and Nelson sum up, “even those employees who
take formal actions inside their company are likely to confront a corporate
culture with a vested interest in transforming their claim from
discrimination to something else.”175
C. The Procedure Lane
The previous section alluded to the use of the procedural device of
summary judgment to dispose of employment discrimination claims.
Commentators have described this phenomenon in the context of sexual
harassment cases and other sex discrimination cases.176 Recently, Professor
Elizabeth Schneider has accounted for the various ways courts use pretrial
procedure to send employment discrimination plaintiffs out of court.177
Professor Schneider looks specifically at pleading requirements, summary
judgment, and the evidentiary burden established for scientific evidence by
the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.178 line of cases.179

174. Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Hoffman & Laura Beth Nielsen, Situated Justice: A Contextual
Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 1, 16 (2012).
175. Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 4, at 686.
176. See, e.g., John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors and the Disappearance of “Vicarious”
Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose
Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV.
1401, 1404 (2002) (arguing that many lower courts have “emasculated” the Ellerth/Faragher rule
in order to dismiss harassment cases by granting summary judgment); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV.
705, 705–06 (2007) (exploring the relationship between grants of summary judgment and sex
discrimination cases); Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 24, at 72 (stating that
it is becoming more common to grant summary judgment in claims of harassment brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Medina, supra note 164, at 315 (stating that in
situations constituting a hostile environment, courts often grant summary judgment due to their
“discomfort with the perceived lack of an injury to the victim”); Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 4,
at 675–80 (describing how case law generally makes it more difficult for employment
discrimination plaintiffs).
177. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PENN. L. REV.
517, 518–19 (2010) (noting that “[j]udicial gatekeeping is happening at an earlier stage than ever
before” and “the greatest impact of this change . . . is the dismissal of civil rights and employment
discrimination cases from federal courts in disproportionate numbers”).
178. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
179. Schneider, supra note 177, at 551–55 (discussing Daubert motions); see also Erica
Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563, 1656 (2000) (stating that the “Supreme Court’s evidentiary trilogy”—
Daubert, Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
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Schneider suggests that the cumulative effect of shifts in these areas results
in increased settlements and fewer trials in these cases.180
In the pretrial context, the most recent cases that have undermined the
ability of a plaintiff to remain in court are 2007’s Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly181 and 2009’s Ashcroft v. Iqbal.182 These cases effectively
changed the pleading standard set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a) from the minimal notice pleading standard183 to requiring a plaintiff to
plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’”184 For over fifty years, the reigning
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 was set out in the
Court’s 1957 decision in Conley v. Gibson.185 In that case, the Court
explained that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”186 After
Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff’s complaint must contain facts that provide a
plausible basis for relief.187 Courts must disregard legal conclusions if not
supported by factual allegations.188 The “possibility” of the defendant’s
wrongdoing is insufficient to withstand this new pleading standard.189 The
526 U.S. 137 (1999)—has made an “important contribution toward rationalizing the jurisprudence
of scientific evidence”).
180. Schneider, supra note 177, at 523. Clermont and Schwab’s data show that there are
actually more trials and likely fewer settlements in employment discrimination cases than other
federal civil cases. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 122, 123 disp.
9. The percentage of employment discrimination cases that are resolved by trial has fallen from
18.2% in 1979 to 2.8% in 2006. There are, however, more trials in employment discrimination
cases than other areas of federal civil practice, where the trial rates have fallen from 6.2% in 1979
to 1% in 2006. See id. at 123 disp. 9.
181. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
182. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
183. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) states that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief
must contain . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–5 (2010) (examining the
history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in
Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 535 (2001) (“The 1938 Rules
liberalized the rules of pleading and joinder . . . making it easier for litigants, even those of modest
means and limited expertise, to have their day in court.”).
184. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
185. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
186. Id. at 45–46.
187. See supra text accompanying note 184.
188. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
189. Id. at 679 (“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))).
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Court in both cases looked for other explanations for the defendant’s
behavior in determining whether the plaintiff’s allegations stated a
“plausible” claim for relief.190 The Court adopted this fact-based
requirement in spite of the Court’s purpose in adopting notice pleading in
modern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 being to avoid the problems
associated with fact pleading.191
Commentators already have begun to examine the implications of the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions on employment discrimination claims.192
While early studies showed a “modest” increase in the granting of motions
to dismiss post-Twombly,193 a more recent study conducted by Professor
Raymond Brescia suggests that once the Court decided Iqbal, there was a
distinct change in motion to dismiss practice in employment discrimination
cases.194 Professor Brescia’s study examined the effects of Twombly and
Iqbal on dismissals in civil rights/employment cases as well as fair housing
cases in which a defendant argued that there was a problem with the
specificity of the facts alleged in the complaint.195 Brescia’s study found
that Iqbal had a significant effect on dismissal rates. In the 41-month
period prior to Twombly, sixty-one percent of motions to dismiss were

190. See id. at 682 (arguing that non-invidious theories for the defendants’ actions were that
they wished to detain illegal aliens and find those involved in the 9/11 attacks); Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (equally plausible explanation for defendants’
actions in antitrust case was that they were engaging in parallel conduct to compete with each
other).
191. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48 (explaining that “[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach
that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome
and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits”); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining the history of
Rule 8(a)); J. Scott Pritchard, The Hidden Costs of Pleading Plausibility: Examining the Impact of
Twombly and Iqbal on Employment Discrimination Complaints and the EEOC’s Litigation and
Mediation Efforts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 757, 759–60 (2011) (describing the history of federal
pleading standards).
192. See, e.g., Michael O’Neil, Note, Twombly and Iqbal: Effects on Hostile Work
Environment Claims, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 151, 154, 175–76 (2012) (expressing concern that
recent judicial interpretations of Twombly and Iqbal could lead to more dismissals of hostile
environment sexual harassment cases).
193. See Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1030 tbl.A (2009). This study of
Title VII, ADA and ADEA claims that showed pre-Twombly, 54.5% of motions to dismiss were
granted and 20.9% were granted in part, for a total of 75.4%. Id. Post-Twombly, 57.1% were
granted, and 20.5% were granted in part, for a total of 77.6%. Id.
194. See Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 239 (2012) (noting “that
the number of dismissals on the grounds that the pleadings were not sufficiently specific has risen
dramatically after [Iqbal], a fact that is missed by looking solely at dismissal rates, and not the
volume of dismissals”).
195. See id. at 262 (discussing the methodology of dismissal rates study).
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granted.196 In the 24-month period between Twombly and Iqbal, courts’
granting of motions to dismiss actually decreased: only fifty-seven percent
of motions to dismiss were granted.197 Post-Iqbal, however, dismissal rates
changed markedly. In the 19-month period following Iqbal, courts granted
motions to dismiss in seventy-two percent of the cases studied.198 While the
study only considered electronically reported trial court cases,199 the study’s
focus on decisions in which these specific cases appear to be having an
impact makes it more helpful than those studies that look at motions to
dismiss more generally.200 Other studies have shown a similar increase in
dismissal rates post-Iqbal.201
What is perhaps more disturbing is that the number of cases in which
defendants have made these motions has accelerated considerably after
Iqbal. Brescia plots this information by quarter, beginning with 2004 and
ending with the third quarter of 2010.202 The number of decisions in the
first quarter of 2004 that addressed a motion to dismiss based on the
specificity of the pleadings was twelve.203 By the third quarter of 2010,
courts issued sixty-one decisions.204 As Brescia points out, this is a greater
than five hundred percent increase.205 This dramatic rise occurred in spite of
no marked increase in federal case filings involving these causes of
action.206 This increase logically means that plaintiffs now are fighting
196. Id. at 262, 269 tbl.1.
197. Id.
198. Id. Brescia also tracked dismissals with prejudice, which showed a similar pattern, but
the results were not statistically significant. Id. at 270 tbl.2, 291 app. C. Likewise, dismissal rates
were particularly high for pro se plaintiffs, with courts granting seventy-four percent of motions
and granting fifty-nine percent at least in part with prejudice in the 41-month period post-Iqbal.
Id. at 272 tbl.4. Once again, these findings were not statistically significant. Id. at 291 app. C.
199. Id. at 241.
200. Id. at 239. Motions to dismiss can be based on matters extraneous to the Twombly/Iqbal
standard, such as failure to exhaust administrative remedies or statutes of limitations. Id.
Twombly and Iqbal would not have an effect on motions based on these and similar grounds. Id.
201. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil Claims, 96
JUDICATURE 127, 127–29, 132 (2012) (discussing a study of federal district court opinions on
Westlaw that revealed a statistically significant increase in dismissal rates and more sizable
increase in dismissal rates based on factual insufficiency).
202. Brescia, supra note 194, at 281, 282 tbl.9.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 282 tbl.9.
205. Id. at 281.
206. Id. at 283, 289–90 app. B. While employment discrimination filings went up slightly
during the study period, housing discrimination claims fell slightly. Id. In addition, employment
discrimination case terminations are generally down. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to
Worse, supra note 6, at 116 disp. 5, 117 (showing a drop in terminations from a high of 23,722 in
1998 to 15,007 in 2007). In terms of the federal civil docket load, employment discrimination
cases went from nearly ten percent of case terminations in 2001 to fewer than six percent by 2006.
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more motions to dismiss, further increasing the costs of this litigation for
the party least likely to possess sufficient wealth to handle additional costs.
The higher costs of litigation in turn increases costs for lawyers, who often
take employment discrimination cases in reliance on the fee-generating
nature of these claims, making it more costly to litigate these cases.207
Likewise, the total number of cases dismissed and dismissed with prejudice
(as opposed to the percentages) increased “exponentially” after Iqbal.208 It
is little wonder that Professor Suja Thomas has referred to the motion to
dismiss as the “new summary judgment motion.”209
In addition to the motion to dismiss, there is another significant motion
that commonly leaves plaintiffs on the courthouse steps: the summary
judgment motion. Many commentators have expressed concern that courts
are too eager to grant summary judgment in employment discrimination
cases.210 Recently, studies have begun to show the significance of this
See id. at 117. In terms of case filings, Nielsen et al. report that the number of employment
discrimination filings peaked in 1997 at 23,796 and have been declining ever since, with the filing
rate declining to 14,353 in 2006. LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND., CONTESTING
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION IN COURT: CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION
1987–2003
(2008),
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/nielsen_abf_edl_report_08_final.
pdf.
207. Nancy L. Lane, After Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Providing
Attorney’s Fees to Plaintiffs in Mixed Motive Age Discrimination Cases, 3 ELDER L.J. 341, 349–
350 (1995) (“[B]ecause civil rights plaintiffs often are not in a financial position to pursue an
employment discrimination suit, including attorney’s fees in the recovery gives attorneys an
incentive to represent these plaintiffs.”).
208. Brescia, supra note 194, at 282, 283 tbl.10.
209. Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under
Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2010). At least some in the Senate
have suggested that the old notice pleading rule be restored. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act
of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. §2 (2009) (putting forth that “[f]ederal courts shall not dismiss a
complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957)”); Pritchard, supra note 191, at 757–58 (describing legislative efforts, including the Notice
Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, to move away from the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard
reforms).
210. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 206 (1993)
(examining the “gradual and continuing erosion of the factfinder’s role in federal employment
discrimination cases and its replacement by an increasing use of summary judgment through
which courts make pretrial determinations”); Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 24, at 805–
09 (discussing articles finding that courts favor granting pretrial motion practice in employment
discrimination cases, particularly in the instances of sexual harassment claims); Medina, supra
note 164, at 313–14 (arguing that federal courts are increasingly turning to “granting summary
judgment to employers accused of employment discrimination on the basis of sex”); Schneider,
supra note 177, at 537–40 (discussing the increasingly higher rates of summary judgment in the
employment discrimination context, contrasted with the historical disfavoring of summary
judgment).
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problem. Professor Joseph Seiner conducted a study of summary judgment
motions in all employment discrimination cases terminated in fiscal year
2006 in which a defendant made a motion for summary judgment.211 Seiner
derived his study’s data from the Federal Judicial Center, and as such, it is
not simply limited to those cases that were reported either officially or
electronically.212 Of the 3,983 summary judgment orders issued in these
cases, courts granted 62.6% of the motions, granted 18.2% in part, and
denied only 19.2%.213 Thus, in over eighty percent of the cases in which a
defendant made such a motion, it was granted in whole or in part.214
While Seiner’s study does not provide information about how many
defendants in employment discrimination cases make summary judgment
motions, anecdotal as well as other evidence suggests they are frequent.215
Professor Vivian Berger, a certified mediator, has noted that most
employer’s counsels state that they will file a summary judgment motion if
211. Seiner, supra note 193, at 1033.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1033 tbl.C.
214. Id. Neilsen et al. found in a study of 1788 cases filed from 1987 to 2003 an average of
eighteen percent of cases were lost on a motion to dismiss and sixteen percent on a motion for
summary judgment. See NIELSEN ET AL., supra note 206, at 2, 29. Clermont and Schwab found
that pretrial dispositions, which include motions, were at about twenty percent in 2006—not much
different than the pretrial disposition rates for other federal civil cases. See Clermont & Schwab,
From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 122–23 disp. 9. An earlier study by Theodore Eisenberg and
Charlotte Lanvers attempted to assess the effect of the game-changing 1986 summary judgment
trilogy—Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986), and Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)—on summary judgment
rates. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates over Time, Across
Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts
(Cornell
Law
School,
Research
Paper
No.
08-022,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138373. Studying three federal district
courts—the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of Georgia, and the Central
District of Florida—they found a marked increase (nearly doubling) in summary judgment rates in
employment discrimination cases in the Northern District of Georgia. Id. at 16. The summary
judgment rates in employment discrimination cases in the Northern District of Georgia reached
almost twenty-five percent for cases terminated in 2001–02. Id. While there was not a similar
increase for other categories or other districts, the rate increased in other civil rights cases in the
Northern District of Georgia. Id. This increase, however, was not statistically significant. Id.
215. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Michael O. Finkelstein & Kenneth Cheung, Summary Judgment
Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45,
48 (2005) (noting that “most employers’ counsel say during mediation that they intend to file a
‘Rule 56’ motion if the case does not settle; and at least in the Southern and Eastern Districts of
New York, a large number of employers do so” (internal citation omitted)); Lawrence D.
Rosenthal, Motions for Summary Judgment When Employers Offer Multiple Justifications for
Adverse Employment Actions: Why the Exceptions Should Swallow the Rule, 2002 UTAH L. REV.
335, 336 (2002) (explaining that “[a]fter the conclusion of discovery in most employment
discrimination lawsuits, employers file motions for summary judgment to dispose of the litigation
prior to trial”). But see supra note 214 (describing studies that suggest summary judgment rates,
overall, are not much higher in employment discrimination cases than other civil cases).
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their case does not settle.216 Likewise, using data from fiscal year 2006, the
Federal Judicial Center took a random sample of 1500 cases from most of
the United States district courts.217 The Center designed the study to
determine the impact on summary judgment practice in federal courts based
on the structure of summary judgment motions, if any, set out in local
rules.218 The study found that in thirty-five percent and thirty-seven percent
of employment discrimination cases studied (depending on summary
judgment motion structure), defendants filed at least one summary
judgment motion.219 This number is quite a higher percentage of motions in
employment discrimination than other types of cases. For example,
defendants moved for summary judgment in ten percent and fourteen
percent (depending on structure) of contracts cases and nine percent and
eleven percent (depending on structure) of torts cases.220 Indeed, of the
categories of cases studied (contracts, torts, employment discrimination,
other civil rights, and other), employment discrimination cases had the
highest percentage of defendant’s filing at least one summary judgment
motion.221 Not surprisingly, employment discrimination cases also had the
highest percentage of courts granting such motions in whole or in part.222
Thus, the anecdotal evidence is borne out by this study. Defendants appear
to make motions for summary judgment more often in employment
discrimination cases when compared to other types of civil filings, and
courts are granting them.
Of course, this leads to the question of whether lawyers who handle
employment discrimination cases simply are bringing weaker cases than
lawyers who handle other areas of the law. Intuitively, it does not seem

216. Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 215, at 48.
217. See generally Joe Cecil & George Cort, Report on Summary Judgment Practice Across
Districts with Variations in Local Rules, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Aug. 13, 2008,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/sujulrs2.pdf (discussing a study
designed to determine if the manner in which movant and non-movant proceed with motions for
summary judgment, based on local rules, appeared to impact outcomes of summary judgment
motions). The study did not include certain types of cases, such as class actions, or cases from
three district courts from which it could not obtain usable data (Western District of Wisconsin,
District of the Northern Marianas Islands, and the District of the Virgin Islands). Id. at 4.
218. Id. at 1.
219. Id. at 12 tbl.7. The percentage of employment discrimination plaintiffs filing summary
judgment motions was decidedly low—three percent of employment discrimination cases. Id. at
13 tbl.8.
220. Id. at 12 tbl.7.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 16 tbl.11. Depending on the structure of the summary judgment motion, the courts
granted such motions either twenty percent of the time or sixteen percent of the time in the cases
studied. Id. Taking contracts cases again as point of comparison, such motions were granted in
whole or in part in only six percent or seven percent of contracts cases studied. Id.
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obvious why plaintiff’s lawyers in this area would do so.223 Employment
discrimination plaintiffs are not known as particularly wealthy clientele.224
As noted earlier, plaintiff’s lawyers bring these cases with the hope of an
award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, as provided by statute.225
Thus, lawyers have a significant financial incentive to take cases that they
have a realistic possibility of winning.226 While it is possible that lawyers
bring weaker cases in hope of a quick settlement, there does not seem to be
a logical reason why lawyers would bring weaker cases in this area than
they would in another area that involves frequently similar risky
compensation—contingent fees generated in tort cases. Yet the study above
shows far fewer motions for summary judgment in torts cases.227 This
disparity suggests that there is significant disagreement in employment
discrimination cases between the plaintiff’s bar and defense bar regarding
what is a worthwhile case. At this point, the federal judiciary is siding
more with the defense bar in employment discrimination than it is in other
areas of the law.228
Plaintiffs fare no better in the federal appellate courts, where the courts
are far more likely to reverse plaintiffs’ victories on appeal than defendants’
victories. In their study of employment discrimination cases in the federal
courts, Clermont and Schwab found that the reversal rate for defendants
who appeal a plaintiff victory in the trial court is 41.10%, whereas the
plaintiffs’ reversal rate when they appeal a defendant’s trial court victory is
8.72%.229 As they note, plaintiffs’ chances of retaining a victory on appeal
“cannot meaningfully be distinguished from a coin flip[,]” whereas
223. Clermont & Schwab play devil’s advocate and argue that it is possible that plaintiffs
bring weaker cases in the employment discrimination context as a potential explanation for the
poor plaintiff win rates in these types of cases on appeal in federal court. Clermont & Schwab,
From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 114 n.34. They subsequently reject this counterargument.
See id. (“It merits stressing that we have never claimed that our attitudinal explanation of the antiplaintiff effect is irrefutable. . . . [A]lthough we concede that this counterargument is coherent, we
maintain that it is unconvincing in [the employment discrimination] setting for a number of
reasons.”); see also Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 4, at 670 (recounting a case in which the judge
was skeptical of classwide discrimination). But see Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over Politics: Recent
Trends in Lower Court Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 482–83
(2008) (arguing that judicial aversion to these claims is a result of caseload, not ideology).
224. See Lane, supra note 207.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i), 2000e-5(k) (2006).
226. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 126, at 1027 (survey of employment lawyers showing that
they are reluctant to take cases that do not have strong evidence of discrimination because of
defendants’ advantages in these cases).
227. Cecil & Cort, supra note 217, at 16 tbl.11.
228. See generally Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 104 (reporting
at the outset its “concluding view that results in the federal courts disfavor employment
discrimination plaintiffs, who are now forswearing use of those courts”).
229. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 110 disp. 2.
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defendants who prevail at trial “can be assured of retaining that victory after
appeal.”230 Clermont and Schwab explain that this discrepancy in reversals
after trial on the merits is particularly disturbing because the issues of intent
relevant in these cases usually entail judgments about witness credibility—
something appellate courts should not be second-guessing on appeal.231
Some commentators have suggested that the disparate rates of reversal
for plaintiffs’ and defendants’ respective appeals in employment
discrimination cases are the result of judicial hostility to civil rights
cases.232 Indeed, former federal district court judge Nancy Gertner
described her experience:
Federal courts, I believe, were hostile to discrimination cases.
Although the judges may have thought they were entirely
unbiased, the outcomes of those cases told a different story. The
law judges felt “compelled” to apply had become increasingly
problematic. Changes in substantive discrimination law since the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were tantamount to a
virtual repeal. This was so not because of Congress; it was
because of judges.233
Gertner posits that judges’ approaches to employment discrimination
cases are skewed by the cases that they see, that is, the cases that do not
settle. Because judges feel that the best cases settle, they come to believe
that all employment discrimination cases are weak and that there is no
significant need for anti-discrimination law.234 This attitude, combined with
asymmetric decisionmaking, whereby judges write detailed decisions when
they grant summary judgment but do not write opinions when they deny the
motions, results in judges adopting what Gertner characterizes as “[l]osers’
[r]ules”—manipulations of the legal rules to get rid of these cases by
granting motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.235 Indeed,
Gertner relates that in the beginning of her judicial career, “the trainer
230. Id. at 112; see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 107 tbl.I, 108 (1999) (reporting similar findings in a
study of ADA cases in several federal circuits).
231. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 112.
232. See, e.g., id. at 112 (identifying an “anti-plaintiff affect” in the federal appellate courts).
Further, plaintiffs in these cases have one of the worst win rates of all civil cases. Id. at 113.
Clermont and Schwab attribute this in part to “attitudinal explanation[s].” Id. at 112. But see
Reeves, supra note 223, at 482–83 (arguing that low plaintiff win rates in employment
discrimination cases should not be attributed to judicial attitudes and general ideology toward
these types of cases, instead advocating for an approach that considers judges’ workloads as part
of an apparent anti-plaintiff bias).
233. Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 109 (2012) (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted).
234. Id. at 111–12, 114–15.
235. Id. at 110.
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teaching discrimination law to new judges announced, ‘Here’s how to get
rid of civil rights cases . . . .’”236
I would take Gertner’s argument one step further. While good cases
used to settle, emboldened by success in motion practice, defense lawyers
have stopped trying to settle cases that formerly would reach early
settlement. In fact, given the prevalence of defendants’ success using
motions, defense counsel would be foolish not to attempt motions to
dismiss and/or summary judgment.237 Whatever the reason, procedural
devices such as motions to dismiss and summary judgment are fruitful
avenues for defendants to use to take these cases out of the court system.
D. The Mediation and Settlement Lanes
The EEOC increasingly has encouraged mediation, which, if
successful, results in a settlement much like a lawyer-negotiated settlement
prior to trial, as a means of resolving employment discrimination suits. It is
estimated that fifty percent of employment discrimination suits settle.238
Clermont and Schwab’s study demonstrates that while fewer employment
discrimination cases settle early in the litigation compared to other cases,
the majority of these cases ultimately settle.239 Scholars have identified
many arguments in favor of mediation and settlement as viable means of
resolving these disputes, especially if the employee wishes to continue to
work for the same employer.240 Indeed, a study of the EEOC’s mediation

236. Id. at 117.
237. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 121. Specifically, Clermont
and Schwab’s research reflects that “employment discrimination plaintiffs manage fewer
resolutions early in litigation compared to other plaintiffs, and so they have to proceed toward trial
more often. Defendants’ resistance reflects awareness of their good chances in court.” Id.
238. See Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 24. The authors also report that most
of the remaining cases are decided on procedural grounds. Id.; see also Nielsen & Nelson, supra
note 4, at 695–96 figs.3 & 4 (illustrating that forty-three percent of employment discrimination
cases settled in 2001).
239. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 122–23 n.57 (finding that
36.66% of jobs cases settle early in the litigation, whereas 58.57% of nonjobs cases settle early,
thus illustrating that “far fewer employment discrimination cases end early in the litigation
process”).
240. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Alternative Dispute Resolution Conflict as Pathology: An
Essay for Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1395 (1997) [hereinafter Delgado, Conflict as
Pathology] (noting that mediation can be faster, less expensive, and more cooperative, despite
ultimately pointing out problems with alternative dispute resolution mechanisms); Richard
Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1366 (1985) [hereinafter Delgado et al., Fairness and
Formality] (noting the informality of the ADR process and therefore its accessibility); Trina
Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1548–50
(1991) (identifying arguments in favor of mediation).
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program showed high participant satisfaction with the program.241 It is not
the purpose of this Article to debate the pros and cons of mediation in this
context, as scholars have done in many articles.242 Instead, once again, this
section will point out that mediation and its concomitant settlement are on
the rise, leaving fewer cases for courts to resolve.
The EEOC’s mediation program provides an example. EEOC
statistics show that the EEOC has been conducting more and more
mediations and resolving more and more cases using mediation since
1999.243 In 1999, the EEOC conducted 7,397 mediations and resolved
4,833 cases.244 By fiscal year 2010, that number had risen to 12,755
mediations, with mediations resolving 9,362 cases.245 The rate of resolution
using mediation has risen as well, beginning with a 65.3% resolution rate in
1999 to an all-time high resolution rate of 73.4% of cases in fiscal year
2010.246 This rate is a much larger number than the number of cases the
EEOC files in court. To illustrate, in fiscal year 2011, the EEOC filed only
300 suits and 261 on the merits.247 This disparity occurred at a time when
241. E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, AN EVALUATION OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM 1, 4–5 (2000),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/report/index.html.
242. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 240, at 1548–49 (advocating that mediation “rejects an
objectivist approach to conflict resolution,” the process is “cooperative and voluntary, not
coercive[,]” “decisions supposedly may be informed by context rather than by abstract
principle[,]” and that “emotions are recognized and incorporated” into the [] process”); see also
Jonathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in Resolving
Sexual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 150–56 (1999) (promoting
mediation in the context of workplace sexual harassment claims); Susan K. Hippensteele,
Mediation Ideology: Navigating Space from Myth to Reality in Sexual Harassment Dispute
Resolution, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 43, 46 (2006) (suggesting that “the sudden and
dramatic shift in public awareness and attitudes toward sexual harassment and the sharp increase
in sexual harassment complaint reporting following the Thomas hearings” adequately explains the
rise in ADR as a mechanism for “re-privatizing sexual harassment”); Mori Irvine, Mediation: Is It
Appropriate for Sexual Harassment Grievances?, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 27 (1993)
(explaining that mediation has been “successful in providing a forum for cases that do not warrant
the time and expense of an arbitration hearing”); Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and
Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583, 597–608 (1999) (outlining reasons why mediation
might improve Title VII enforcement). Mediation appears to be especially controversial in the
sexual harassment context, e.g., Hippensteele, supra, as well as for members of traditionally
disempowered groups, such as women. See Grillo, supra note 240, at 1549–50 (arguing that
compulsory mediation can be destructive to many women).
243. The precise number of mediations conducted from 1999 to 2012 is 159,760. EQUAL
EMP. OPP. COMM’N, EEOC MEDIATION STATISTICS FY 1999 THROUGH FY 2012,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/mediation_stats.cfm [hereinafter EEOC MEDIATION
STATISTICS] (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, FY 1997 THROUGH FY
2013, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
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charge filing was at an all-time high; in fiscal year 2011, complainants filed
nearly 100,000 charges with the EEOC.248 One might assume that the
increase in mediations is a result of the increase in charge filings. Statistics
show, however, that the EEOC mediated 10% of charges in 1999, whereas
13% of charges were mediated in 2010.249 The number of charges resolved
through mediation likewise rose by 3%—from 6% of charges in 1999 and
9% of charges in 2010.250 The EEOC has entered into some 200
agreements with large employers that create standing agreements that the
particular employer will use the EEOC’s mediation program to resolve
charges.251 In addition, local EEOC district offices have entered into more
than 1,500 such mediation agreements.252
The EEOC’s success in resolving charges has increased over the years,
with some intermittent variations. Overall, by comparing 1997 to 2011
statistics, it appears that the EEOC is resolving more charges through
settlement, resulting in the withdrawal of charges with benefits to the
charging party. For example, in 1997, 3.8% of the resolutions occurred by
settlement, whereas 9.1% of charges were resolved by settlement in fiscal
year 2011.253 In some of the years between, settlement rates rose as high as

According to the EEOC’s website, “[m]erits suits include direct suits and interventions alleging
violations of the substantive provisions of the statutes enforced by the Commission and suits to
enforce administrative settlements.” Id.
248. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, EEOC CHARGES STATISTICS FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2013,
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [hereinafter EEOC CHARGES STATISTICS]
(last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
249. This statistic was calculated by dividing the number of mediations in 1999 (7397) by the
number of charges filed in 1999 (77,444). Similarly, for 2010, the number of mediations for that
year (12,755) was divided by the number of charges filed for 2010 (99,922). EEOC MEDIATION
STATISTICS, supra note 243; EEOC CHARGES STATISTICS, supra note 248.
250. This statistic was calculated by dividing the number of charges resolved by mediation in
1999 (4,833) by the number of charges filed in 1999 (77,444). Similarly, for 2010, the number of
charges resolved by mediation for that year (9,362) was divided by the number of charges filed for
2010 (99,922). EEOC MEDIATION STATISTICS, supra note 243; EEOC CHARGES STATISTICS,
supra note 248.
251. Press Release, Equal Emp. Opp. Comm’n, EEOC and CVS Caremark Sign National
Mediation
Agreement
(June
29,
2010),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-29-10b.cfm.
252. See id. (noting that the EEOC has created a universal agreement to mediate to facilitate
employers’ entering into mediation agreements); see also EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N,
UNIVERSAL
AGREEMENT
TO
MEDIATE,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/universal_agreement.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014)
(showing same).
253. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, ALL
STATUTES FY
1997–FY 2012,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
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12.2%.254 Similarly, 3.4% of charges were withdrawn with benefits to the
charging party in 1997, whereas 5.1% were withdrawn in 2011.255
The above data shows that employment discrimination charges
commonly end by resolution through settlement or mediated settlement and
that the EEOC’s emphasis on mediations has increased recently. Like other
avenues examined,256 this practice results in cases being taken out of the
public view that is the court system.
III. SOME PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATIZATION AND THE VANISHING TRIAL
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident employment
discrimination plaintiffs are having a tough time getting their suits into
court and remaining there.257 Although this position is not without
controversy,258 Professor Marc Galanter has documented the overall
phenomenon of the “vanishing trial” and has argued that this trend is
problematic for a number of reasons.259 In a similar vein, in his
groundbreaking 1984 article, Against Settlement, Professor Owen Fiss
suggested that the then-burgeoning alternative dispute resolution system,
where many employment discrimination claims are now resolved, is also
problematic due to issues surrounding settlement.260 The positions of these
scholars, however, are not without their detractors, including those who
have noted that trials were never all that prevalent.261

254. Id. This rate was for fiscal year 2007. The rate was actually down slightly from prior
years in 2011.
255. Id.
256. See supra Part II.B.
257. See Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 6, at 958 (remarking that “prisoners
have less difficulty maintaining their trial victories than do nonprisoner civil rights plaintiffs”).
258. For example, Gillian Hadfield disagrees with some of the data on vanishing trials relied
upon by Professor Galanter; in particular, Hadfield argues that there are problems with the data in
this area because the courts count cases as “terminated” that might not be concluded. Gillian K.
Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical
Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 705,
709 (2004). Hadfield also believes there are problems with coding cases. Id. at 711–12, 713 tbl.1.
259. Galanter, supra note 9, at 29–33.
260. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1073–75 (arguing that, as a general premise,
settlement should be treated as a “highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets”).
261. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG.
STUD. 689, 689, 691 (2000) (arguing that trials have never been the “norm” and that “[c]ivil trials
do not make much of a mark on popular culture”); Hadfield, supra note 258, at 714–15 (arguing
that the number of cases terminated by jury trial since 1979 has been “relatively stable”). For
purposes of employment discrimination suits, jury trials did not become available until the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006). Thus, earlier data
regarding jury trials is inapplicable to the cases discussed here because jury trials simply were not
available to plaintiffs in those cases.
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In employment discrimination cases specifically, commentators have
expressed concern that plaintiffs experience double harm as they are
harmed at the hands of their employers and by the legal system’s treatment
of their cases.262 Given the prevalent judicial hostility in this context, these
plaintiffs may fare better before juries, by settling a case before filing suit,
or at least settling before motion practice begins.263 One could then
reasonably argue that it may not be such a bad thing that employment
discrimination cases are being resolved in other arenas besides the legal
system.264 While this argument certainly would favor plaintiffs settling
these cases, it does not address the experiences of plaintiffs who brought
cases to court and watched as their claims were thrown out on motions to
dismiss or motions for summary judgment. These plaintiffs receive
nothing.265
This Part examines the problems with the many paths that lead
plaintiffs out of the courts by examining settlements, arbitration, and
internal employer grievance mechanisms.266 It then suggests that trials have
262. See, e.g., Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 15 (study of employment
discrimination plaintiffs, lawyers, and employer representatives in which researchers noted
“[p]laintiffs frequently narrate their experiences of the law as financially devastating, emotionally
wrenching, and personally damaging”). Former federal district court judge Nancy Gertner and
Melissa Hart refer to the two stories discrimination lawsuits tell—one about discrimination by the
employer and the other about potential discrimination by the judge. Nancy Gertner & Melissa
Hart, Employment Law: Implicit Bias in Employment Litigation, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS
ACROSS THE LAW 80, 87 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012). This second story
involves not only the bias of the judge in viewing the facts but also the development of legal
doctrine that is biased against plaintiffs. See id. at 87.
263. See Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 7 (finding most individuals are
dissatisfied when their disputes are “transformed by lawyers” and the court system); see also
Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 130 (in a study of federal employment
discrimination cases from 1979 to 2006, plaintiffs won in trials before juries 37.63% of the time,
whereas they won in bench trials 19.62% of the time).
264. See Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 5 (noting that absent fair process,
confidence is lost “in the ability of legal institutions to resolve future grievances,” creating
legitimacy issues and undermining future legal behavior).
265. Indeed, even plaintiffs who settle using the EEOC conciliation or mediation program
often receive nothing. EEOC MEDIATION STATISTICS, supra note 243 (showing that between
1999 and 2012, anywhere from 912 to 1285 mediations resulted in no monetary benefits to the
complainant).
266. There is a large body of literature canvassing the debate about the vanishing trial,
including whether it is actually vanishing and whether or not this is a good thing. See supra notes
258, 261; see also Hadfield, supra note 258, at 709 (illustrating how changes in statistical
reporting and court management practices could account for this phenomenon). In addition, there
are many legal scholars who have addressed problems related to arbitration and mediation of
employment disputes. See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward PostDispute Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination Claims, 8 NEV. L.J. 58, 67–68
(2007) [hereinafter Green, Measures to Encourage] (describing the various disadvantages facing
both employers and employees in arbitration); Michael Z. Green, Tackling Employment
Discrimination with ADR: Does Mediation Offer a Shield for the Haves or Real Opportunity for
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benefits, both private and public, that litigants should consider before
abandoning them completely.267 It ends with a bit of a reality check. Right
now, plaintiffs are not faring well in the legal system. 268 But is the real
solution to take cases out of the adjudicatory system or rather to suggest
corrections that might make the system more just?
There is an obvious reason why plaintiffs avoid the legal system.269
Empirical studies have shown employment discrimination plaintiffs do not
fare well in court.270 In addition to losing their claim, they also experience
incredible personal upheaval and disappointment when their cases do not
turn out as they had hoped.271 Indeed, Clermont and Schwab’s study of
federal court employment discrimination cases saw a distinct drop in the
number of terminations between 2001 and 2006—from ten percent of
terminations in 2001 to six percent in 2006.272 Clermont and Schwab
suggest that the decline results from plaintiffs and their lawyers filing fewer
cases due to their dim prospects for success in federal court.273
In their study of participants in employment discrimination cases,
Berrey, Hoffman and Nielsen detail the difficulties facing plaintiffs in the
the Have-Nots, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 321, 347–53 (2005) [hereinafter Green, Tackling
Employment Discrimination] (commenting on the inherent power imbalances in arbitration); Matt
A. Mayer, The Use of Mediation in Employment Discrimination Cases, 1999 J. DISP. RESOL. 153,
164–66 (1999) (discussing the potential disadvantages for mediating employment discrimination
claims); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law,
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 457 (1999) (explaining that “[a]rbitration fails the public because it
does not further the basic objective of the statute” while litigation fails because it is an expensive
and lengthy process); Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing
Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1482–89
(2004) (stating that three factors—the societal interests in eliminating discrimination, tension
between public and private goals, and the impact of societal/individual tension—make
employment discrimination suits particularly difficult to resolve). It is not my intent to address all
the arguments surrounding each of these areas of debate. Instead, I will suggest why the many
lanes that lead employment discrimination claims out of court are a cause for concern.
267. See generally David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2619, 2623 (1995) (noting that developing the advocacy skills of litigants serves both private
and public goods); Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1085 (describing some benefits of
public adjudication, including the growth of court interpretations of legal doctrine).
268. See Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 6, at 957–58 (emphasizing the
starkly different success rates of defendants and plaintiffs in civil rights disputes).
269. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 108–15 (discussing
the “anti-plaintiff effect” in the appellate process of employment discrimination cases).
270. Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 6, at 957–58.
271. See Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 16–17 (describing the overwhelming
feeling of disappointment amongst plaintiffs who thought that either the whole legal system or
specific aspects of the trial were biased against them).
272. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 117; see also NIELSEN ET AL.,
supra note 206 (noting that employment discrimination case filing peaked at 23,971 in 1997,
declining to 14,353 in 2006).
273. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 118.
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litigation process.274 Berrey and her colleagues interviewed a variety of
parties involved in employment discrimination suits,275 including plaintiffs,
defendants and employers. While the law appears neutral, and indeed
employment discrimination plaintiffs believe they are playing on an even
playing field,276 the legal system actually favors those in power—meaning
those with more resources and experience.277 As Berrey and her colleagues
explain, “[p]laintiffs frequently narrate their experiences of the law as
financially devastating, emotionally wrenching, and personally
damaging.”278 Berrey and her colleagues also describe how both parties in
an employment discrimination suit operate under the fiction that they are
somehow on equal footing in a system in which the fact finder will decide
the case on the merits.279 Instead, they found that reliance on this myth of
fairness “can cloak the many ways in which employers actually shape the
terms and outcomes of disputes.”280 Only three of the forty-one plaintiffs
that these researchers interviewed were very satisfied with the outcome of
their cases.281
With experiences like those described above, it is little wonder that
individuals who believe they are wronged by employment discrimination
seek out alternative forms of dispute resolution, such as mediation or
settlement.282 Mediation offers advantages in terms of party control,
preserving relationships, and the possibility of creating win-win solutions,
among other things.283 Arbitration is arguably quicker and less costly.284

274. See Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 15–18 (discussing plaintiffs’
“[d]ashed [h]opes for [f]airness” in the employment discrimination litigation context).
275. Id. at 9–11 (describing the methods of the qualitative study).
276. Id. at 18 (noting that most plaintiffs are optimistic “that the law could be a fair arbiter of
their workplace disputes”).
277. See id. at 8 (citing empirical research to illustrate that certain “structural features” of the
American legal system “produce tangible material advantages for affluent defendants and
corporate litigants”).
278. Id. at 15.
279. Id. at 12.
280. Id. One advantage employers have in these disputes is that the defendant has an easier
time defending a claim than the plaintiff does pursuing a claim because defendants can rely on
organizational supports and past experience to minimize the burdens of litigation. Id. at 19. In
addition, the defendants’ representatives are not named in the lawsuit, thereby avoiding the
personal hardships the plaintiff endures during the course of litigation. Id. at 20.
281. Id. at 26 (twenty-three were not at all satisfied and fifteen were ambivalent).
282. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1982)
(describing the many advantages of mediation over the adversarial system, namely that it is
cheaper, faster, and more collaborative).
283. See Harkavy, supra note 242, at 156–61 (detailing the advantages of mediation in the
sexual harassment context).
284. Moohr, supra note 266, at 403.
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So, why do I insist on arguing in favor of trials in the face of these contrary
realities?
There are many arguments for why trials, and specifically jury trials,
are good in this area of the law.285 Distinct problems emerge and are
associated with each alternative dispute resolution mechanism, whether it
be by settlement, arbitration, or an internal employer grievance
mechanism.286 I will examine each of these approaches briefly, in the
context of common arguments against different forms of alternative dispute
resolution.
One of the consistent criticisms of settlement derives from its
confidential nature.287 Because most settlements require confidential terms
and conditions, there is no way for the larger society to examine or judge
whether the settlement is fair.288 Such settlements also provide no norm for
future decisions, whether it be by judicial resolution or private settlements,
about what is an appropriate amount of compensation for the injuries the
defendant caused and the plaintiff incurred.289 Eventually, lawyers will not
even know how to assess what is a fair settlement or how to value a case,
because so few cases get to trial.290 This prevents a benchmark from which
lawyers can bargain from evolving.291
Instead of emphasizing what is fair compensation or a just resolution
for plaintiffs, settlement involves a variety of extra-legal concerns.292 Marc
Galanter emphasized how settlement occurs in the “‘shadow of the law,’”293
meaning that, while settlements are inevitably influenced by legal
285. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1075 (comparing settlement to “the civil
analogue of plea bargaining”—consent is often coerced, the bargain may be drafted by someone
without the proper authority, and justice may not generally be served by the process).
286. Id. at 1076–85 (detailing how power imbalances, the absence of authoritative consent,
and a lack of foundation for continuing judicial involvement plague the alternative dispute
resolution realm).
287. Id. at 1085 (noting that courts are “reactive institutions,” and thus the confidential nature
of settlements do not properly allow courts to proceed with the development of the law).
288. See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 4, at 693 (noting “[b]ecause we have virtually no
information on how favorable settlements are for plaintiffs, this represents an enormous gap in our
knowledge about discrimination litigation”).
289. Luban, supra note 267, at 2653 (noting that discovery information can be of great public
importance to litigators and the public good alike).
290. See id. at 2651–58 (discussing the value of “sunshine laws” and their ability to create
transparency in the judicial process).
291. Id. at 2622 (describing how “court system[s] not only resolve disputes,” but they also
create “rules and precedent”; private judges in contrast are “terribly inefficient producers of
rules”).
292. See generally id. at 2621–26 (comparing the public value of public adjudication with the
public disservice of private dispute resolution).
293. Galanter borrowed this phrase from Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser. See
Galanter, supra note 25, at 525 (citing Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 950).
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standards, they also take into account “considerations of expense, delay,
publicity and confidentiality, the state of the evidence, the availability and
attractiveness of witnesses, and a host of other contingencies that lie beyond
the substantive rules of law.”294 Owen Fiss specifically linked the
considerations that go into settlement with the ideals of justice:
The bargaining that normally takes place between litigants—
characterized . . . by the pursuit of self-interest, imbalances of
material resources, inequalities of information, and strategic
behavior—has no connection to justice whatsoever. It is
obviously not constitutive of justice, nor is it much of an
instrument for achieving justice. On occasion, bargaining might
produce a just outcome, just as the judicial process might
sometimes fail and produce an unjust outcome. But there is no
reason to presume that the outcome of the bargaining process—a
settlement—is just. All we can presume of a settlement is that it
produces peace—often a very fragile and temporary peace—and
although peace might be a precondition for the achievement of
justice, it is not justice itself.295
Clearly settlements do not necessarily lead to justice, which is a “public
good.”296 Thus, when parties settle, “society gets less than what appears,”
and justice may well not be done.297
Richard Delgado takes this argument one step farther by positing that
avoiding conflict in favor of cooperation, which is touted as one of the
advantages specifically of mediation, is actually problematic:
In a society like ours, conflict is normal, the ordinary state of
affairs. Our society is made up of competing classes in endless
struggle: consumers and manufacturers; whites and the
descendants of former slaves; workers and factory owners. This
conflict is normal, maybe even healthy. Smoothing it over
ignores something important.
And structuring a dispute
resolution system so as to treat its every manifestation as a sign of
unhealth is a very big mistake.298

294. Id. at 525–26.
295. Fiss, History of an Idea, supra note 21, at 1277.
296. Id.
297. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1085. In his early work on the subject, Fiss
was particularly concerned about the nature of consent in settled cases and the impact that a lack
of resources might have on particular parties. Id. at 1075–76. Fiss concedes that resource
imbalance can also influence outcomes in court but argues that the “guiding presence of the
judge” may serve to “lessen the impact of distributional inequalities.” Id. at 1077–78.
298. Delgado, Conflict as Pathology, supra note 240, at 1401 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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Delgado’s article also notes that anger and indignation, clear characteristics
of conflict, can fuel reform.299
Commentators have likewise criticized settlements that involve courts,
such as consent decrees or settlements of class actions.300 Fiss criticizes
consent decrees because the judge never has the opportunity to hear the full
story, unlike a trial.301 Thus, such decrees may not reflect the real factual
background of the case or provide relief that reflects the actual harm. 302
Marc Galanter argues more generally that decisions become more detached
from facts, or at least facts as brought out in the unique setting of a trial. 303
Galanter blames part of the rise of settlements on the expansion of
managerial judging, whereby judges possess broad discretion to clear their
dockets using whatever means at their disposal—including settlements.304
In the 1970s and 1980s, judges added case management and mediation
duties to their roles as adjudicators.305 Galanter sees this increase of
responsibility as a reflection of a wider shift in legal culture, that is, “part of
a much broader turn from law, a turn away from the definitive
establishment of public accountability in adjudication.”306 Indeed, he
argues that the aversion to litigation also encompasses an “aversion to the
determination of corporate accountability in public forums.”307 I find merit
with this observation. For example, in the context of employment
discrimination, it is particularly objectionable for an employer to be called
racist or sexist; having these cases decided outside the public sphere works
to the advantage of employers in many ways.308 Owen Fiss also lauds the
public dimension of adjudication, stating:
Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers
chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in

299. See id. (noting that conflict is the normal state of affairs in our society).
300. Galanter, supra note 9, at 28.
301. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1083.
302. See Galanter, supra note 9, at 28 (describing adjudication as a “spiral of attribution in
which supposedly autonomous decision-makers take cues from other actors who purport to be
mirroring the decisions of the former”).
303. Galanter, supra note 25, at 530.
304. Id. at 519–20.
305. Id. at 520. Galanter explains that “judicial ideology” is one factor influencing the longterm decline of the trial: “The primary role of courts, in this emerging view, is less enunciating
and enforcing public norms and more facilitating the resolution of disputes.” Galanter, supra note
9, at 16.
306. Galanter, supra note 9, at 22.
307. Id.
308. THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE
TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 197–200 (2005) (discussing reform efforts for
sexual harassment law to reflect proper punishment and induce deterrence).
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which the public participates. These officials, like members of
the legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has
been defined and conferred by public law, not by private
agreement. Their job is not to maximize the ends of private
parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give
force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring
reality into accord with them. This duty is not discharged when
the parties settle.309
Even researchers who lament the treatment of employment
discrimination claimants underscore that “settlements essentially buy
employers out of trouble.”310 In the context of employment discrimination
cases, this purchase relieves employers of an obligation or incentive to
examine their workplaces and consider that there may be organizational
structural components that permit discrimination to flourish.311
The corporate desire to have cases heard outside of the legal system
and to maintain employer control over the process is exhibited most vividly
in the rise of employer grievance mechanisms for discrimination claims and
the courts’ adoption of these mechanisms into the law itself.312 Lauren
Edelman and her colleagues have accounted for the phenomenon of these
employer implemented solutions to individual discrimination claims from a
sociological perspective.313 Edelman and her colleagues applied the idea of
legal endogeneity in this context, which posits that “the content and
meaning of law is determined within the social field that it is designed to
regulate.”314 In this specific context, the researchers trace the ascendency of
internal grievance mechanisms from a supposition (largely unfounded at the
time it was suggested) in the professional personnel literature that such
grievance mechanisms would limit the liability of companies for
employment discrimination to the adoption of such mechanisms as a
defense to supervisor hostile environment claims.315 Note that there is no
substantive link to eliminating discrimination; instead, employers
309. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1085.
310. Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 26.
311. See id. (stating that “[e]mployers’ assertions of unfair settlements maintain the myth that
discrimination lawsuits are typically meritless”).
312. Edelman, Uggen & Erlanger, supra note 107, at 412–14 (discussing the significant
benefits, such as cost savings, available to organizations that institute internal grievance
procedures).
313. Id. at 408 (noting that their argument has typically been construed as institutionalist,
however, they intend to prove that the “organizational ideologies of rationality induce the
judiciary to incorporate grievance procedures into legal constructions of compliance with EEO
law” (emphasis in original)).
314. Id. at 407.
315. Id. at 409.
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developed these mechanisms largely to avoid liability. 316 The interesting
thing about these grievance mechanisms is that the courts accepted them as
a solution to sexual harassment cases with little evidence regarding what, if
any, type of system would remedy such discrimination.317 Criticism of the
court’s reliance on internal grievance mechanisms has focused on both their
efficacy as well as the social fact that most targets of sexual harassment do
not complain using these systems.318
Another advantage of trials is that they are public, which permits
observation of and the ability to comment on the proceedings.319 With
regard to the trend toward sending cases to arbitration, Texas state court
judges Craig Smith and Eric Moyé lament the loss of the public nature of
trials, arguing:
Our civil justice system is an open court system, where public
and private disputes are resolved in transparent proceedings. This
system “ensures that the people . . . benefit from a full public
airing of the issues, and it allows innovations and solutions
learned from today’s cases to help resolve tomorrow’s
disputes.”320
Delgado also argues that adjudication allows society to confront new
issues directly, rather than having to resolve them in “[i]nvisible, back-

316. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 13–25 (2001) (discussing how antidiscrimination training programs were designed to help avoid or reduce employer liability);
Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in
Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 17–21 (2003) (explaining how the human
resources community quickly embraced both the Faragher and Ellerth decisions in crafting
“recipe[s] for legal compliance,” which employers consequently incorporated into their workplace
structures); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 126, at 980–1010 (discussing the prevalence of litigation
prevention advice and legal compliance strategies).
317. See Martha S. West, The Federal Courts’ Wake-Up Call For Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV.
457, 461–62, 467–68 (2002) (discussing how women are reluctant to report harassment); BEINER,
supra note 308, at 158–61 (discussing that victims of harassment rarely report it as required by
Ellerth/Faragher standard for imputing liability to employers for supervisors of sexual
harassment); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 316, at 29–44 (addressing the pitfalls of anti-discrimination
training); Grossman, supra note 316, at 41–49 (discussing the efficacy of employer prevention and
training efforts).
318. BEINER, supra note 308, at 159–66 (describing studies suggesting victims rarely report
sexual harassment).
319. See Paul Butler, The Case for Trials: Considering the Intangibles, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG.
STUD. 627, 629–30 (2004) (explaining how the O.J. Simpson trial increased public consciousness
by “illuminat[ing]” the “vast gulf between African Americans and whites about the fairness of”
the criminal justice system).
320. Smith & Moyé, supra note 106, at 297 (quoting Wallace B. Jefferson, The State of the
Judiciary in Texas, 70 TEX. B.J. 314, 314 (2007)).
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room negotiation.”321 Others link this public aspect of trials to storytelling.
Describing trials as “one of the few official forums for story telling[,]” Paul
Butler asserts that “[w]ith fewer trials, we lose some public stories, and
their official morals (i.e., verdicts).”322 This phenomenon can thus lead to
public uncertainty about the law as well as societal mores.323
This loss of certainty in the law is particularly profound in
employment discrimination cases, an area of law in which the public,
through its legislators, has pronounced its support for equality of treatment
at work.324 As employment discrimination is less overt in modern times, it
becomes difficult for the public to know when it actually occurs.325 This
difficulty is especially problematic in harassment cases, in which the fact
finder uses a “reasonable person” standard to determine whether the
harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable.326 How is an
employer or employee supposed to know what reasonable people believe if
so few cases are decided by juries? It is little surprise that one of the
common complaints with respect to sexual harassment law is that
employers and employees alike do not know what it is.327 Public trials
could both inform the public while helping end such troubling and yet
persistent workplace behavior.328
Paul Butler argues that jury trials also have value as a reflection of
democracy because jurors reflect the diversity of American citizens.329 He
posits, however, that just as juries have become increasingly more
diversified, trials have simultaneously begun to vanish; he argues this could
be viewed as a form of white flight from the legal system similar to that

321. Delgado, Conflict as Pathology, supra note 240, at 1405.
322. Butler, supra note 319, at 634.
323. See id. (noting that when the public does not have access to facts and must collect these
facts from several venues—as opposed to one—it creates confusion and uncertainty).
324. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95 (2003) (explaining
that legislators enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “as part of a social movement
against discrimination in all aspects of life,” including equal treatment in employment).
325. See id. at 99–108 (discussing the structural and organizational changes in the workplace
that have impacted the way in which discrimination operates in this context in the wake of Title
VII’s passage).
326. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
327. BEINER, supra note 308, at 15; Grossman, supra note 316, at 40.
328. BEINER, supra note 308, at 15–16 (discussing how few sexual harassment cases are
decided by jury verdicts, leaving employers and the public guessing as to what constitutes
actionable sexual harassment).
329. Butler, supra note 319, at 632–34 (arguing that diversity of jurors is one of many
intangible benefits of trials).

2014]

THE MANY LANES OUT OF COURT

883

which occurred after school desegregation.330 Another benefit to trials is
that litigants in employment discrimination cases see going to trial as a
statement of principle.331
Fiss sees trials as embodying public principles that go beyond the
particular dispute between the parties. In his later work on his concerns
regarding fewer trials, Fiss argued that adjudication is meant to produce just
outcomes, and society loses this when parties decide to settle.332 As he sees
it, “[j]ustice is a public good, objectively conceived, and is not reducible to
the maximization of the satisfaction of the preferences of the contestants,
which, in any event, are a function of the deplorable character of the options
available to them.”333
Studies suggest that employment discrimination plaintiffs have more
success before juries than judges; as Clermont and Schwab note,
employment discrimination plaintiffs win at trial less than other plaintiffs
overall.334 Win rate differentials lessen considerably, however, for jury
trials.335 The comparison between employment discrimination plaintiff
wins before juries and wins before judges is telling. In their study of trials
between 1979 and 2006, they found that plaintiffs win 19.62% of bench
trials compared with 37.63% of jury trials.336 As Clermont and Schwab
opine, “it may be that trial judges are more demanding of plaintiffs than

330. Id. at 632; see also Delgado, Conflict as Pathology, supra note 240, at 1406 (arguing that
ADR is favored by Republican business leaders because it sidetracks disputes by those who
should be fighting, including civil rights claimants); Galanter, supra note 9, at 20–21 (explaining
that “large sections of business, political and legal elites embraced a set of beliefs and
prescriptions about the legal system that, for want of a name, I have called the ‘jaundiced
view’”—in this view, “trials are not only expensive, but are [also] risky because juries are
arbitrary, sentimental, and ‘out of control’”).
331. Butler, supra note 319, at 634. In their interviews with employment discrimination
plaintiffs, Berrey and her colleagues noted that almost half “stress[ed] that, even if they lost their
cases, they are glad they pursued the case” and spoke of “‘fighting’ for justice.” Berrey, Hoffman
& Nielsen, supra note 174, at 17.
332. Fiss, History of an Idea, supra note 21, at 1277 (“All we can presume of a settlement is
that it produces peace—often a very fragile and temporary peace—and although peace might be a
precondition for the achievement of justice, it is not justice itself.”).
333. Id.
334. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 129 (ranging from 28.47% for
employment discrimination plaintiffs as compared with 44.94% for other plaintiffs).
335. Id. at 130 (noting that employment discrimination plaintiffs win jury trials 37.63% of the
time as compared with 44.41% for other plaintiffs).
336. Id. (reviewing data from 1979 to 2006). The gap between win rates closed some at the
end of the study period, but a disparity remains. See id. Nielsen and Nelson also note similar
findings for data from 1990 to 2001, with plaintiff success rates during this period ranging from
36% to 44% before juries and from 14% to 33% before judges. Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 4,
at 698.
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juries are, or at least are exhibiting a well-founded fear that appellate judges
are more likely to reverse judgments for plaintiffs.”337
Arbitration of employment discrimination claims has its own set of
problems, including the often-cited “structural advantage” employers have
as “repeat players.”338 Employers are advantaged in a system they use
often, while employees, who are often only one-time players, are at a severe
disadvantage in terms of experience.339 In addition, because arbitrators
often see the same employers, they have a financial incentive to rule in the
employers’ favor so that those employers will continue to choose them to
arbitrate their next case.340 There is also a lack of fairness with regard to
employment arbitration clauses, which are generally presented to
employees as “take it or leave it” provisions341 that they must accept if they
want the job or, in some cases, to continue in their jobs. Smith and Moyé
argue that this façade of cooperation is not the type of arm’s length
bargaining that those who drafted the FAA envisioned for enforceable
arbitration clauses.342 Smith and Moyé note that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v Jackson,343 permitting arbitrators to
determine even the issue of the unconscionability of the employment
contract,344 only makes the apparent conflict for arbitrators worse in these
cases.345 As they further explain, “[t]his effectively gives the arbitrator the
discretion to decide whether or not he or she has authority to perform a task
that he or she will receive income for completing, thus creating an inherent
337. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 131. They also note that in
certain types of cases lawyers rely on misperceptions about the sympathies of judges versus juries.
Id. at 130–31.
338. Green, Measures to Encourage, supra note 266, at 65 n.31 (citation omitted); see also id.
at 67–69 (discussing the various disadvantages both employers and employees must confront in
the arbitration context).
339. See Smith & Moyé, supra note 106, at 298 (“Because [larger corporate parties] arbitrate
repeatedly, they benefit from increased familiarity with the arbitrators as well as the arbitration
process. This pattern also creates a potential for arbitrators to act in a manner inconsistent with
the neutrality that is critical to the fairness and effectiveness of the arbitration process.” (internal
citation omitted)).
340. See id. (identifying that this phenomenon is known as “repeat player bias”).
341. See Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695,
705–20 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing in detail the many criticisms of the
unfair nature of arbitration clauses).
342. See Smith & Moyé, supra note 106, at 287 (noting that Congress intended the FAA to
apply to contracts between parties at arm’s-length and not to parties with unequal bargaining
power). Another effect of enforceable arbitration clauses is that a person must “yield his or her
very access to the courts in order to meaningfully participate in our modern society.” Id. at 282.
343. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
344. Id. at 2779–81.
345. Smith & Moyé, supra note 106, at 293–94 (stating that this decision may also result in an
increase in the number of gateway issues, like unconscionability, going to arbitrators).
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and untenable conflict of interest.”346 The result, from these two judges’
perspective, is another example of the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial being eroded.347
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts appear eager to find other arenas where employment
discrimination plaintiffs can resolve their claims. In light of this trend,
employment discrimination plaintiffs would be rational to pursue other
remedies outside the legal system, and, indeed, the latest data suggest they
are beginning to abandon the federal adjudicatory system. Alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms, however, may not offer the panacea
employment discrimination plaintiffs seek, given that there is no way of
knowing whether settlements, resulting from mediation or otherwise, are
indeed just. Much of my analysis regarding problems in the court system
would not be possible if the courts did not issue written decisions that are
subject to public scrutiny. I would not be able to argue, for example, that
the Court’s interpretation of the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 with
respect to arbitration is wrongheaded without those public decisions to
reference. With many employment discrimination cases settling, there is
simply no way to determine if justice is truly being done. While settlement
may provide plaintiffs with more control over the outcome, there is no way
to criticize the current system unless some brave plaintiffs bring their cases
to court.
The impact of resolving these cases “in the shadow of the law” goes
beyond simply whether a given settlement or arbitration result is just.
Society loses the opportunity to condemn employer practices that it
considers discriminatory as well as to participate in the public debate that
occurs in court cases about what is appropriate behavior in the workplace.
In the context of harassment cases, in which the standard is based on the
“reasonable person,” jury input on what the average person would find
harassing would help develop not only appropriate standards for court
determinations, but also appropriate standards for workplace conduct that
employers might implement. Society loses something in both the

346. Id.
347. See id. at 295 (stating that the judicial interpretation of the FAA, creating in effect a
“classwide” arbitration scheme, is responsible for this erosion of the right to a jury trial (internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 301 (classifying blanket enforcement of arbitration agreements as
effectively “assault[ing]” the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial); see also Jean R.
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a
Jury Trial, 16 OH. ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669, 674–75 (2001) (explaining “[m]ost courts have not
directly confronted the tension between the cases governing jury trial waivers and those governing
arbitration clauses” because courts have not been presented with these particular issues).
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development phase as well as the outcome phase when these decisions are
not public. Perhaps most importantly, we, the public, lose the opportunity
to see just what is going on in modern workplaces and therefore cannot
evaluate and condemn the widespread discriminatory practices that remain.
So, in the end, I find myself arguing in favor of employment
discrimination plaintiffs bringing their cases in the federal court system. 348
While the system is currently not operating in an ideal manner, this
circumstance is cause to suggest reform—not abandonment.

348. I also believe that some state court systems are more hospitable to claimants. While my
emphasis here has been on the federal court system, in part because there is more data on the cases
litigated in this forum, the state court systems offer the same public benefits that the federal court
system provides.

